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INTRODUCTION 
 
At least half of personal health spending in the U.S. is related to behavior, lifestyle or 
other avoidable causes. It has become increasingly important for policy makers to 
understand what affects behavior and why certain policies work while others do not. 
Economist are interested in how these policies affect health behaviors and how these 
behaviors affect economic outcomes. In this dissertation I analyze two state level 
policies and their effects on health and health behaviors. In my last chapter I analyze 
the effect of a particular health behavior –obesity– on an economic outcome: wages. 
In my first chapter, I study a reform that occurred in Tennessee in which the state 
disenrolled about 170,000 individuals from the Medicaid Program. The majority of 
these individuals were childless adults. I use this reform to investigate what happens 
to individuals when they lose public health insurance in terms of their health, health 
behaviors and health care utilization. Using data from the 2000-2010 Behavior Risk 
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) and restricted-use versions of the 2000-2010 
National Health Interview Survey with state identifiers, I compare differences in 
outcomes between childless adults and other adults in Tennessee with the associated 
differential for these two groups across other Southern states, before and after the 
reform. I confirm that the 2005 TennCare disenrollment significantly decreased overall 
health insurance coverage, and I provide the first evidence that the disenrollment 
significantly decreased health care access, out of the people being dropped 70 percent 
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of them reporting not being able to afford going to the doctor. I also document 
increases in the number of days with bad health. I do not find consistent evidence of 
effects for preventive care, although I do find suggestive evidence of increases in 
healthy behaviors. Overall the effects of the reform are concentrated among less 
educated childless non-elderly adults. These findings have potentially important 
implications for recent state public insurance expansions that are part of federal health 
care reform. 
The second chapter, co-authored with Christopher S. Carpenter, analyses the 
enactment of a bill adopted in 26 states named Commonsense Consumption Acts 
(CCAs) – aka ‘Cheeseburger Bills’ –that greatly limit fast food companies’ liability for 
weight-related harms. We provide the first evidence of the effects of CCAs using 
plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of CCA adoption across states. In two-way 
fixed effects models, we find that CCAs significantly increased stated attempts to lose 
weight and consumption of fruits and vegetables among heavy individuals. We also 
find some evidence that CCAs increased employment in fast food. Finally, we find 
that CCAs significantly increased the number of company-owned McDonald’s 
restaurants and decreased the number of franchise-owned McDonald’s restaurants in 
a state. Overall our results provide novel evidence supporting a key prediction of tort 
reform – that it should induce individuals to take more care – and show that industry-
specific tort reforms can have meaningful effects on market outcomes.  
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In the third chapter, co-authored with Andrea Moro and Tommaso Tempesti we study 
how a health behavior can affect economic outcomes. We estimate the effects of being 
obese on wages accounting for the level of personal interactions required by the job 
and accounting for job selection. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth 1979 (1982 - 2006) combined with detailed information about jobs from 
O*Net, our results show that the obesity penalty occurs mostly on white women and 
that this penalty is higher in jobs that require a higher level of social interaction. In 
addition, we find that accounting for selection increases the estimates of the wage-
penalty by 50% compared to estimates that ignore job selection. This provides strong 
evidence that a health behavior can greatly affect the economic outcomes of an 
individual and in turn impose a cost for society.  
These three chapters provide empirical evidence that policies have an effect on 
people’s health behavior and that changes in health behavior can affect health and 
economic outcomes. These results show that losing public health insurance is 
detrimental for population health. Tort reform policies for fast food make the industry 
stronger and induce intentions to change health behaviors but these intentions do not 
translate to actual changes. White women receive a wage penalty for being obese, and 
this seems to be driven by women who work in jobs where social interactions matters 
more.   
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CHAPTER 1 
EFFECTS OF LOSING PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE ON 
HEALTHCARE ACCESS, UTILIZATION AND HEALTH OUTCOMES: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE TENNCARE DISENROLLMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
There is an extensive literature in health economics that explores the effects of public 
health insurance eligibility on health outcomes and access to health care (Buchmueller 
et al. 2015; Finkelstein et al 2014; Currie and Gruber 1999; Kolstad and Kowalksi 
2012). However, most of what we know of the relationship between health insurance 
and health comes from empirical investigations of people gaining public health 
insurance. There has been relatively less research done on the effects of losing public 
health insurance on health, mostly due to lack of exogenous events that cause people 
to lose public health insurance eligibility. This paper is the first comprehensive study 
of the effects of losing public health insurance on population health outcomes using a 
quasi-experimental design. Specifically, I consider the effects of one of the largest 
public health insurance disenrollments in the U.S.: the 2005 Tennessee disenrollment 
in which approximately 170,000 residents were dropped from the state’s Medicaid 
program, TennCare. This reform targeted non-elderly childless adults, an understudied 
population in the health insurance literature. This population is of particular interest 
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since most of the recent Affordable Care Act (ACA) expansions target childless 
adults.1  
Theoretically, predictions regarding the effects of losing health insurance on 
health are not necessarily symmetric to the predictions regarding the effects of gaining 
health insurance. The main difference relies on the accumulation of health capital: 
individuals who have had health insurance for an extended period of time could have 
a greater level of health capital than a person who has not had health insurance. For 
instance, consider a diabetic woman who has had health insurance for an extended 
period of time. During this time she has been able to learn that she has a chronic 
condition, the degree of the problem, and how to handle it. She has received 
information about the importance of an adequate diet and she may have had access to 
prescription drugs. Once this person loses health insurance, even though her health 
care access is reduced, she does not lose the information she has on her health 
condition. In contrast, consider the same woman who starts out without health 
insurance. In that case, it is likely that she would not have been able to obtain as much 
information on her health condition during her uninsured spell. If she gains health 
insurance, not only will her health care access increase but she may also experience 
                                                     
1 I define childless adults as adults who report having no children under 18 years-old living in their 
household. Using family relationships within the household I am also able to identify adults with 
dependents and adults without dependents.  
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large and immediate information gains. These and other examples illustrate the 
possibility of asymmetries in the effects of losing and gaining health insurance. 
While the few investigations of the effects of losing health insurance have 
focused on one particular health related outcome, this paper studies a broad range of 
health outcomes. First I study people's decisions to go to the doctor and their rates of 
preventive care utilization.2 I consider this to be the primary mechanism through 
which losing health insurance may affect health. Second, I study how losing health 
insurance affects self-rated health status and the number of reported sick days. I also 
consider the effects on where people choose to obtain medical care and their total 
demand for care. Finally, I am also able to study changes in risky and non-risky health 
behaviors to identify the presence of moral hazard.  
In order to answer these questions, I use an exogenous reform that caused 
people to lose public health insurance. In 2005, Tennessee underwent a major 
Medicaid cutback, in which approximately 170,000 residents lost public health 
insurance eligibility. Recent research has examined the effects of this reform on labor 
supply (Garthwaite et al. 2014), hospital uncompensated care (Garthwaite et al. 2015) 
                                                     
2 To this point there are two studies that examined the effect of the TennCare reform on a health related 
outcome: Hearvin et al. (2011) and Ghosh and Simon (2015). Heavrin et al. (2011) evaluate the effects 
of Tennessee’s disenrollment on Emergency Department visits. Ghosh and Simon (2015) evaluate the 
effects of the disenrollment on hospitalizations. There have also been reports by the Robert Wood 
Johnson Foundation (Farrar et al. 2007) that describe through anecdotal evidence and interviews the 
effects of the disenrollment on an individual’s heath status.  
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and inpatient hospitalizations (Ghosh and Simon, 2015).3 The cutbacks were made on 
the 1994 TennCare Reform, which had expanded eligibility for public health insurance 
to non-traditional Medicaid beneficiaries. This expansion group was mostly composed 
of non-elderly childless adults and people who were considered “uninsurable.”4  
In doing so, the 2005 reform targeted a particular subpopulation that has been 
understudied in the health insurance literature: childless adults. At least half of the 
uninsured adult population in the United States is composed of childless adults. These 
individuals are 19 to 64-year-olds who are commonly lower income, less educated, and 
either work for an employer that does not provide health insurance or do not work 
enough hours to qualify for benefits (ASPE 2005). This population constitutes a large 
portion of the population that would be affected by numerous Medicaid expansions 
under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that aim to close the health coverage gap 
between individuals who are not poor enough to qualify for Medicaid but not wealthy 
enough to purchase private health insurance.5 Therefore, if any future cutbacks target 
the most recent expansions, childless adults may be the first group to lose coverage.6 
                                                     
3 An inpatient is a patient that had a doctor recommend to stay at least one night in the hospital. 
4 This term refers to people who have been previously denied private health insurance.  
5 Estimates range from 15 to 20 million of individuals covered by the ACA Medicaid Expansions. 
(Kenney et al., 2012)  
6 In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court (Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services) overturned the 
provision of the law requiring Medicaid expansions, leaving the decision up to each state. Since then, a 
considerable number of states have decided not to use federal money to expand Medicaid programs. 
As of March 2013, 17 states opposed Medicaid Expansion (Kaiser Report 2013). 
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My empirical strategy uses the sharp state-specific timing of the disenrollment 
combined with the fact that it mostly targeted childless adults to obtain inference on 
the effects of losing public health insurance eligibility on health care access, utilization 
of care and health outcomes. The first approach is a straightforward Difference-in-
Differences (DD) model that compares residents of Tennessee to those of other 
southern states before and after the disenrollment. The second approach uses a triple 
difference (DDD) model to take advantage of the fact that the vast majority of 
individuals who lost eligibility during the reform were childless adults. Garthwaite et 
al. (2014) estimate that 91% of those affected by the disenrollment were adults without 
dependents under the age of 18. I compare the differential in outcomes of adults with 
and without children in Tennessee to the associated difference for the same groups in 
other southern states before and after the reform. In addition, given the single-state 
nature of my treatment, to account for state specific shocks I use synthetic control 
methods to corroborate my findings (Abadie et al. 2010).  
I estimate that the TennCare disenrollment significantly decreased the 
likelihood of having health insurance between 2 and 5 percent. I provide evidence of 
decreases in health care access; specifically, I estimate an increase in the likelihood of 
forgone or delayed medical care due to cost of at least 10 percent and a decrease in the 
likelihood of seeing a general doctor of 4 percent. This serves as a mechanism to 
understand the decreases in health status. I estimate that the reported number of days 
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with bad health over 12 months increased by 0.6 days (out of a mean of 5 days), and 
the number of days incapacitated increased by 0.84 days (out of a mean of 4.7 days).  
In terms of demand for medical care, I provide evidence that the likelihood of 
people to change their place of care due to health insurance reasons increases by 
almost half out of a mean of 3 percent. This effect is larger for low educated 
individuals, who experience a 115 percent increase. Relatedly, I find that, after the 
reform, this group is less likely to report the doctor’s office or HMO provider as their 
source of usual care and is more likely to report an Emergency Department (ED), 
hospital outpatient department or a clinic as their source of usual care. In terms of 
health care utilization, I show that the likelihood of going to an Emergency 
Department increases by 7 percent along the intensive and extensive margins. I also 
find a 20 percent decrease in the number of surgeries and the likelihood of having a 
surgery.  
In terms of inpatient stays, using survey data I find a 10 percent decrease in 
the number of times a patient has stayed overnight in a hospital. Using administrative 
data I find a 40 percent decrease in the number of discharges per hospital quarter for 
the non-elderly. I also I find a significant 20 percent reduction in the payments coming 
from Medicaid and a 30 percent increase in the payments coming from the patient. 
These results are larger for individuals with a high school degree or less and they are 
robust to the choice of alternative control groups as well as inference adjustment that 
accounts for the single-state nature of the reform. I also find suggestive evidence of 
10 
 
the presence of moral hazard: I estimate an 8 percent increase in the likelihood of 
getting a flu shot and engagement in healthier behaviors.  
My paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: First, I provide 
the literature’s first comprehensive evidence on the population health effects of losing 
public health insurance eligibility using a quasi-experimental design. Second, I 
investigate possible mechanisms of how changes in health insurance status can affect 
health, and in doing so I provide evidence of how people’s decisions regarding health 
care and health behaviors changed after the disenrollment. Third, part of the mixed 
evidence of public health insurance eligibility effects on healthcare utilization comes 
from analyzing different types of data: survey data versus administrative data. In my 
paper, I use both types of data. I provide evidence from two population representative 
surveys and one administrative dataset on inpatient hospitalizations. Furthermore, 
having numerous datasets allows me to study the reform in a comprehensive way by 
investigating not only health care access but also changes in preventive care, health 
behaviors, health care utilization and health status.   
In addition to these contributions, this paper is important for policy-makers 
since it provides evidence on a particular population of interest: childless adults. This 
population is the target of the recent ACA Medicaid expansions which have recently 
met significant opposition, and their future is highly contingent upon political and 
economic environments. Especially since a considerable number of states have opted 
to depend on state funding rather than federal funding to comply with the ACA. Even 
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if most of the ACA mandates are not repealed, it is not unreasonable to expect that 
budget deficits could drive states to enact public health insurance cutbacks similar to 
the 2005 disenrollment in Tennessee.  
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following manner. Section 2 describes 
the existing literature on the effects of changing public health insurance eligibility on 
health. Section 3 provides institutional background on the 2005 TennCare reform. 
Section 4 explains the empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 
presents the results, and Section 7 offers a discussion and conclusions.  
2. Literature Review 
In this section I review the literature on the effects of policy-induced changes in health 
insurance on health outcomes, with a focus on studies examining public health 
insurance eligibility.  
2.1. Studies on the effects of gaining insurance coverage on health    
A large literature in economics has examined the effects of obtaining public health 
insurance eligibility on health outcomes. I focus here on papers with populations 
similar to the one I study: namely, non-elderly childless adults.7 
                                                     
7 I do not review a large literature that has studied policy induced changes in public health insurance 
eligibility for different target populations such as: Medicaid expansions for pregnant women (Currie and 
Gruber, 1996b) and infants (Currie and Gruber, 1996a; Dafny and Gruber, 2005), or obtaining coverage 
through Medicare for the elderly (Card, Dobkin and Maestas, 2004; 2009; Finkelstein and McKnight, 
2008). Buchmueller et al (2015) summarizes the main findings from the extensive literature of the effects 
of the Medicaid program on a variety of economic and health outcomes. 
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Recently, two health care reforms have received a significant amount of 
attention: the 2008 Oregon Medicaid Lottery and the 2006 Massachusetts health 
insurance reform. Both of these reforms mostly affected non-elderly adults. In fact, it 
is estimated that around 56 percent of the people affected by Oregon Lottery were 
childless adults while 50 percent of people affected by the MA health reform were 
childless adults (Garthwaite et al., 2014).  
There are three main papers that estimate the effects of the Oregon Medicaid Lottery 
on health outcomes: Finkelstein et al. (2012), Baicker et al. (2013) and Taubman et al. 
(2014). These studies provide evidence from survey data and administrative data on 
the effects of the Oregon Medicaid Lottery in which some individuals were randomly 
selected to gain Medicaid eligibility. From survey data the studies found that outpatient 
visits increased by 35 percent and the likelihood of having a prescription filled 
increased by 15 percent. They also document increases in preventive care: namely 
cholesterol tests, blood tests for diabetes, mammograms, and Pap tests. Nevertheless, 
they did not find changes in diagnoses for any of the conditions that were associated 
with the changes in preventive care. They also find increases in self-assessed measures 
of health but did not find evidence of changes in ER utilization or inpatient stays.8 In 
contrast, using administrative data to study the intervention showed that inpatient 
                                                     
8 The authors conjecture that the increases in self-reported ratings of health can be mostly explained by 
the reductions in financial distress.  
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admissions increased by 30 percent while ER visits increased by 40 percent over an 18 
month period.9  
The impact of the Massachusetts health reform of 2006 on adult health has been 
extensively studied. This reform expanded Medicaid while at the same time creating 
incentives to obtain private health insurance. Most of these papers use a Difference-
in-Difference strategy to compare outcomes in Massachusetts before and after the 
reform with the associated changes in outcomes for individuals in other states. They 
find evidence that the Massachusetts reform increased health coverage by about 6 
percent (Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012; Long et al., 2009), which consequently increased 
access to care (Long et al., 2014), breast and cervical cancer screenings three years after 
the implementation (Sabik et al., 2015) and self-assessed ratings of  health 
(Courtemanche et al., 2014). Miller (2012) and Long et al. (2012) found a reduction in 
ED utilization between 5 and 8 percent. Finally, Kolstad and Kowalsi (2012) found no 
evidence of changes in inpatient admissions but they do document a decline in 
inpatient admissions originating from the ED. 
There are other less studied Medicaid expansions from Wisconsin, New York, 
Maine and Arizona, each with different target populations and unique aspects of the 
expansions. DeLeire et al. (2013) and Burns et al. (2014) study the Wisconsin Medicaid 
expansion that occurred in 2003 and allowed approximately 9,000 residents to gain 
                                                     
9 They report that the increase in inpatient stays is mostly not originating from the ED.  
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health insurance. This expansion was targeted at low-income, uninsured and non-
elderly adults with chronic health conditions. Both studies used administrative claims 
data from 2008-2009. Burns et al. focus on the population of rural adults while DeLeire 
et al. (2013) focus on adults from all areas.10 DeLeire et al. (2013) found that outpatient 
visits increased by 29 percent, emergency department visits increased by 46 percent, 
inpatient hospitalization decreased by 59 percent and preventable hospitalizations 
decreased by 48 percent. Burns et al. (2014) found that obtaining public health 
insurance eligibility increased the likelihood of outpatient visits by 39 percent, 
preventative services by 93 percent (i.e. physical check-ups, health education, and 
smoking cessation), and inpatient visits by 124 percent.11 The expansions from New 
York, Maine and Arizona were studied by Sommers et al. (2012). They compared the 
expansions in these states to neighboring states and found that Medicaid coverage 
increased by 2.2 percentage points and that the expansions were associated with a 
reduction in all-cause mortality for older, non-white, lower income individuals. They 
also find reduced rates of delayed care and increases in “excellent” and “very good” 
ratings of self-assessed health.  
                                                     
10 DeLeire et al. (2013) use an individual fixed effect model to identify changes in outcomes within 
individuals over time, while Burns et al. use a regression discontinuity method to compare individuals 
who enrolled in the public health insurance program right before and after the date of last enrollment, 
which was an unforeseen date since the enrollment was supposed to continue after that date. 
11 In both cases, their sample is not representative of the average uninsured person. In DeLeire et al. 
(2013), the authors do not have a control group made of individuals who did not gain coverage. This 
means that part of their estimated effect might be driven by reasons unrelated to changes in health 
insurance coverage.  
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Another recent study examines the effects of an insurance expansion for 
childless adults, despite that it is not a public health insurance expansion per se. 
Barbaresco et al. (2014) use a provision from the ACA (in effect since September 2010) 
which extends the permissible age for individuals to remain under their parents’ health 
insurance plan to age 26. They use a difference-in-difference approach in which the 
treatment group is composed of 23-25 year-olds (right below the age cutoff) and the 
control group is made up of 27-29 year-olds. The authors found that this mandate 
increased the likelihood of having health insurance, having a primary care doctor, and 
reporting excellent health. They also found that the provision decreased the likelihood 
of being unable to afford medical care and receiving a flu vaccine.  
2.2. Studies on the effects of losing insurance coverage on health 
In contrast to the numerous studies of gaining public insurance eligibility, I am 
aware of no published work in economics on the health effects of losing public health 
insurance eligibility.12 In a recent working paper, Ghosh and Simon (2015) use the 
same TennCare reform I study here and investigate its effects on inpatient 
hospitalizations. They find that that the disenrollment decreased the share of 
                                                     
12  Recently, Garthwaite et al. (2014) studied the effects of the 2005 TennCare disenrollment on 
employment and labor force participation. Using the Current Population Survey, they found that the 
reform was associated with a 4.6 percentage point increase in employment for childless adults. This 
effect was stronger for jobs providing employer health insurance and for individuals working more than 
20 hours a week. Their results suggest that if individuals were able to obtain health insurance 
independently from their employers, some of them would leave their jobs, work less hours, or exit the 
labor force. In addition in Garthwaite et al. (2015), the authors used the Tennessee reform to study the 
effects on the disenrollment on uncompensated care provided by hospitals. They found that the 
disenrollment caused an increase of $138 million dollars in uncompensated care. 
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hospitalizations covered by Medicaid by 21 percent. They also find a 75 percent 
increase in the uninsured hospitalizations originating from emergency department 
visits. They report that uninsured hospitalizations increased for both avoidable and 
unavoidable conditions, which does not suggest lack of preventive care. They find 
suggestive evidence of decreases in inpatient stays. This research complements my 
findings on the effects of the disenrollment; I not only study the effects of the 
disenrollment on the sample of inpatient hospitalizations but also provide evidence of 
the effects for the overall population using two population-based representative 
datasets.  
In the medical and health policy fields, there are a several additional studies on 
people losing health insurance.  Hearvin et al. (2011) compared emergency department 
(ED) visits in Tennessee before and after the disenrollment controlling for state linear 
and non-linear trends. Using administrative data from hospitals, they found that the 
overall number of outpatient visits decreased while the share of uninsured individuals 
visiting EDs increased. In my paper, I find increases in the number of visits to the ED 
as opposed to decreases.  Since they do not provide a control group to compare 
Tennessee’s outcomes, it is possible that their estimated effect reflects both changes 
from the TennCare reform and the regional trend decline in ED visits that was 
occurring around the same time.  
Lurie et al. (1984; 1986) explore the effects of a contraction of California’s 
Medicaid expansion program in 1982. California cut public health insurance eligibility 
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for 270,000 medically indigent residents and transferred the funds to subsidize the 
medically indigent’s cost of care in county health care facilities’. However, counties 
were not obliged to provide free care. Lurie et al. (1986) perform a survey of 215 
individuals, of which 186 were affected by the disenrollment and rest were part of a 
control group. They found that the population affected by the disenrollment had 
higher levels of uncontrolled hypertension and lower access to care six months after 
the disenrollment.  
Oregon went through a reform in 2003 that was similar to the one in 
Tennessee.  The reform included a stricter premium payment policy, cutbacks on 
benefits, increases in premiums, and the introduction of co-payments resulting in 
individuals losing their public coverage. Carlson, et al. (2011) studied the effects of this 
reform.  They collected their own survey data, eight and ten months after the reform.13 
They found that 31 percent of respondents reported losing public coverage and 
remaining uninsured, while another 15 percent reported continued disrupted coverage. 
Those who remained uninsured were less likely to have a primary care visit and more 
likely to report unmet health care needs than those who had continuous coverage.14 A 
potential concern with this study is that technically the state did not terminate 
eligibility. Individuals chose to leave the program, which implies that the comparison 
                                                     
13 They used the data to compare three groups: those who were not affected by the reform, those who 
lost it but reacquired it, and those who lost it and remained uninsured through their period of analysis. 
14 Those with disrupted insurance coverage had similar effects which were smaller in magnitude. 
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groups could have unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the health 
outcomes under study, thus potentially biasing the estimated effects.  
In 2005, Missouri also undertook a health reform that involved Medicaid 
cutbacks. This reform resulted in approximately 100,000 residents losing Medicaid 
coverage while others faced reduced benefits and higher cost-sharing. Zucherman et 
al. (2009) studied this reform using a combination of administrative data and 
interviews with providers and managers. Comparing outcomes before and after the 
reform (i.e. a single differences) they found an increase in the number of uninsured, 
an increase in uncompensated hospital care and a decrease of hospital revenues.15 
There are also some relevant studies on the effects of losing health insurance 
that are not about losing public health insurance per se. For example, Anderson et al. 
(2012, 2014) have a two papers that studied individuals aging out of their parents’ 
health insurance plans at the ages of 19 and 23. In both cases, they found a decrease 
in ED visits, with a larger effect on the older group. For the younger group, losing 
health coverage led to a 40 percent reduction in ED visits. For the older group, it led 
to an approximately 88 percent reduction. They explain that the disparity is due to the 
fact that individuals at age 19 have lower socioeconomic status which makes them 
more likely to be covered by a means-tested program while those at age 23 are typically 
not in school and are not working in jobs that provide health insurance.  
                                                     
15 They also found that community health centers were "forced" to apply for larger state grants and 
increase their prices.   
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Overall, the existing literature on the health effects of public insurance 
eligibility expansions has found a positive relationship between health insurance and 
health care access as well as self-assessed health, although the mechanism for the latter 
outcome has not been clearly established.16 There is mixed evidence on the effects for 
preventive care and ER visits.17 This paper adds to this body of literature in economics 
and complements our understanding of the relationship between public health 
insurance and health.   
3. Institutional Background 
This section summarizes the context of the disenrollment that occurred in Tennessee. 
I describe a brief history of the program and the political context that led to the 
decision and timing of the reform. To an extent, people affected by the disenrollment 
were not necessarily aware if they would be disenrolled or when it would happen.  
In the early 1990s a Tennessee state budget report projected a budget deficit 
of $250 million which was largely driven by increased Medicaid spending. In addition, 
                                                     
16 For example, people could be stating they have better health because they are in a better financial 
status because of insurance rather than having improved clinical outcomes.  
17 Existing theory provides an ambiguous prediction on the effect of losing health insurance on health. 
On one hand, losing health insurance increases medical care costs and lowers demand for medical care 
could end up having a negative impact on health (Grossman, 1972). On the other hand, losing health 
insurance coverage can lead to changes in preventive care efforts and health behaviors that have positive 
effects on health (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). Exactly the opposite effects are in place when an individual 
gains health insurance, but it is not clear that the magnitude of the effects needs to be symmetric. In 
terms of ED utilization, there is no clear ex-ante prediction on how losing health insurance would affect 
ED visits. It is possible that individuals who have had health insurance are more informed about how 
the system works and therefore would be less likely to use ED as their source of care. On the other 
hand it is possible that people who lose health insurance avoid going to the doctor long enough until it 
becomes an urgent enough situation for the patient to attend the ED. 
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a substantial part of the Medicaid funding (around $400 million) came from a special 
tax on hospitals and nursing homes and this provision was soon to end. This led 
Governor Ned McWherter to invoke a task force to identify three options for the state 
legislature. The three options were: 1) increase state taxes, 2) reduce health care or 
provider reimbursement rates, and 3) engage in a comprehensive restructuring of 
health care delivery and financial systems. Governor McWherter took this opportunity 
to push his vision of expanding Medicaid by pushing the third option to the state 
legislature. This third option would be a major overhaul of the way Medicaid was 
delivered and funded in Tennessee. This reform would become the beginning of 
TennCare.18  
TennCare had two main goals: to control costs and to expand coverage. In 
order to control costs, the state decided to enroll its Medicaid recipients into managed 
care insurance plans. The idea was to transfer the federal and state payments for 
indigent care from hospitals to insurance coverage. In addition, new state taxes were 
created to help finance the expansion. The savings from transitioning enrollees to a 
managed care organization and the new tax income were then used to expand coverage 
                                                     
18 The state legislature approved a federal waiver that authorized deviations from standard Medicaid 
rules. This waiver was part of a 5 year demonstration project. The credibility of Tennessee to have 
sustainable managed care depended on the participation of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee. The 
idea behind TennCare was two-fold: to control cost and expand Medicaid coverage. The first goal was 
to be achieved by enrolling all of their Medicaid recipients into a managed care insurance plans. 
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to uninsured individuals with incomes up to 400% of the federal poverty line and to 
those considered "uninsurable" by private insurance companies.19  
Individuals who benefited from this expansion were mainly non-traditional 
Medicaid beneficiaries. Compared with traditional Medicaid recipients, the expansion 
group was more likely to be white, between the ages of 21 and 64 year old, and have 
higher income.  This expansion allowed for childless adults, who had never been 
covered by Medicaid prior 1994, to be covered under TennCare. The enrollment into 
TennCare started in January of 1994. New enrollees had premiums based on their 
income level, though this did not deter applications.  
By 2000, it was clear that the system was not sustainable, since health 
expenditures were rising faster than Tennessee's budget. Independent auditors 
recommended either reducing coverage, cutting benefits, or increasing taxes, but none 
of these suggestions were popular solutions.20 In 2003, Democrat Phil Bredesen was 
elected as Tennessee’s new governor. During his campaign, he promised to take care 
of TennCare’s accrued debt. Although Bredesen assured Tennessee residents that he 
was going to work with the managed care organizations to find ways to cut costs 
                                                     
19 To be considered “uninsured” in 1994, individuals had to be uninsured as of March 1, 1993; to be 
considered “uninsurable,” individuals had to prove that they were denied private health insurance 
coverage (Moreno and Hoag, 2001). 
20 In 2002, a re-verification process started in which everyone under TennCare had to be re-verified for 
program eligibility. Most of the people who applied for re-verification continued to be covered under 
TennCare (Ruble, 2003). The information from the re-verification process was used to determine who 
was covered under the 1994 expansion and who was covered under traditional Medicaid. In addition, 
eligibility requirements were changed for the uninsurable category. A Medical review of "insurability" 
was required instead of the regular of denial of coverage from private insurers. 
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without dropping people from the program, in January 2005 Bredesen announced that 
a major disenrollment would happen that year, and that it would affect the people 
covered under the 1994 expansions.21 By August 2005, individuals started receiving 
letters stating that their TennCare health insurance coverage was terminated. This 
disenrollment continued until May 2006; in total, about 170,000 residents were 
dropped from the program. Figure 1 shows the monthly TennCare enrollment and 
confirms there was a very large and sharp decrease in the TennCare enrollments during 
this time period.  
4. Empirical Strategy 
My research design compares changes in outcomes of interest between Tennessee and 
other Southern states before and after the reform. In addition, I use the fact that this 
reform targeted mostly childless adults to compare the differential in outcomes of 
adults with children and adults without children in Tennessee to the same differential 
in other Southern states before and after the reform.22 These specifications allow me 
to interpret my results as the causal effects of the disenrollment on health outcomes.23  
                                                     
21 In fact, he told the press that people with disabilities and uninsurable status would still be covered. 
22 For comparison purposes, the percentage of adults with no dependents who were affected by the 
Massachusetts health care reform and the Oregon Health Experiment was around 50%. Kenny et al. 
(2012) predict that the ACA expansion group will be composed of 82.4% childless adults. 
23 I also explored as control groups states that border Tennessee and states selected by the standard 
synthetic control method (Abadie et al., 2010); both yielded similar results. I use the definition of 
southern states given by the U.S. Census; this contains the following states: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, South Carolina, and West Virginia. 
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The first approach makes use only of the relative change in outcomes in 
Tennessee versus other southern states in a Difference-in-Differences (DD) model. 
Specifically, I estimate the following equation: 
(1) Yist = β0 + β1(Post July 2005 ×  TN)𝑠𝑡 + β2Xist + δt + αs + ϵist 
Each outcome 𝑌  is measured for individual 𝑖  in state 𝑠 , at time 𝑡. Here, time is a 
month-year combination. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦 2005 ×  𝑇𝑁 is a variable that takes the value of 
1 for individuals in Tennessee who reported outcomes after July 2005, and 0 for 
everyone else. The coefficient on this variable, 𝛽1 , represents the Difference-in-
Differences treatment estimate of interest. I control for state fixed effects (𝛼𝑠) and for 
year and month fixed effects (𝛿𝑡) which include year dummies as well as month 
dummies to account for any seasonality in outcome responses (i.e. the possibility of 
responding more positively during the summer months). 24  𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡  is a vector of 
individual level controls such as education, race, age, gender, and marital status. I 
estimate this specification for the full-sample but also for the sample of adults with 
children (who were not targeted by the reform) and the sample of adults without 
children (who were targeted by the reform). My identifying assumption is that 
outcomes in Tennessee would have evolved in the same way as other Southern states 
in the absence of the disenrollment conditional on observable characteristics. 
                                                     
24 This is true in the BRFSS specification. In the NHIS specification I do not have information of 
month of interview for all observations and so I do not include this variable. 
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My second specification is the triple difference model which uses the fact that 
the TennCare disenrollment targeted childless adults. This model takes the form: 
(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + (𝛾𝑔 × 𝛼𝑠) + (𝛾𝑔 × 𝛿𝑡) + (𝛼𝑠 × 𝛿𝑡) + 𝛽1(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ×  𝑇𝑁 ×
𝑁𝑜 𝐾𝑖𝑑)
gst
+ 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑔𝑠𝑡 
As in the DD specification, I index individual 𝑖, in state 𝑠, at time 𝑡 and group 𝑔 which 
indicates if the individual is a childless adult.25 In this DDD specification the estimate 
of interest is the coefficient on the triple interaction 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑇𝑁 × 𝑁𝑜 𝐾𝑖𝑑, 𝛽1. This 
interaction terms takes the value of 1 if an individual does not have dependents under 
18 in the household, lives in Tennessee and is reporting outcomes after July 2005, and 
0 otherwise. 𝛾𝑔 is a dummy variable that indicates the childless status of the individual 
(i.e. if they have dependents in the household or not).  Thus, I include state, year, and 
childless status fixed-effects in the model as well as any two-way interactions between 
these three sets of fixed effects. This makes my estimates robust to any state-year (e.g. 
a state program that does not differentially affect childless adults vs. adults with 
children), state-childless (e.g. a Tennessee specific outreach to childless adults that is 
constant over time), and year-childless status (e.g. any national outreach campaign that 
affects childless adults) specific effects. In this case, my identifying assumption is that 
the difference between the two demographic groups (adults with children and adults 
without children) would have evolved similarly in Tennessee to the differential in other 
                                                     
25 I defined a childless adult as an adult who lives in a household with no other member under the age 
of 18 
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southern states in the absence of the disenrollment. In other words, the two 
demographic groups are allowed to evolved differently from each other, but the 
differential between these two groups would have evolved similarly in Tennessee to 
the rest of southern states in the absence of the disenrollment. For my estimates to be 
biased in the DDD, there has to be a trend or an event – around the time of 
Tennessee’s disenrollment – that affects adults with children and adults without 
children differently and this pattern is not consistent across the control states. As an 
example, if we hypothesize that Medicaid premiums were changing in this period of 
time in southern states - with each state having different changes – then the effect of 
the premiums would also have to be different for adults with children and adults 
without children to bias my results.26 I consider this specification to be more robust 
and have a weaker identifying assumption that the DD model; therefore, it is my 
preferred specification.27 
To estimate appropriate standard errors, I use a modified version of block 
bootstrap developed by Garthwaite et al. (2014). Traditionally, I would need to account 
for serial correlation within states over time and this is usually done by clustering 
standard errors at the state level. However as MacKinnon et al. (2014) point out, 
                                                     
26 As reviewed on the background of the reform, I am not aware of any other policies in Tennessee 
that affected childless adults and adults with children differentially around this time period.   
27 I also estimate models by changing the timing of the DDD variable to different starting points. For 
some outcome variables BRFSS asks if a procedure was done in the past 12 months. In these cases, I 
create a variable that represents the number of months an individual is exposed to the reform by 
accounting for the months lapsed between disenrollment and the interview.  It takes a fractional value, 
from 0-1.  Separately, I aggregate the data at the state-year level and re-run the main specifications. The 
different specifications provided similar results to the ones presented in this paper. 
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clustering relies on the number of clusters being large. In this study the number of 
clusters is 17, and therefore the main assumption for Cluster Robust Variance 
Estimation (CRVE) becomes hard to justify. In addition, the percent of treated units 
matters for the finite sample properties of CRVE to hold. In simulations Mackinnon 
et al. (2014) show that this could lead to an over-rejection of the null hypothesis. In 
order to account for this issue, in additions to CRVE, I use a modified version of block 
bootstrap which is composed of a two stage sampling across states and within states. 
In the appendix, I use Monte Carlo simulations to test the finite sample properties of 
this method and to perform comparison across other standard error adjustment. I 
conclude that the modified version of block bootstrap has rejection rates closer to the 
appropriate value (using a p-value of 0.05, we would want 5% rejection rates).   
  Additionally, as it is becoming popular with single state interventions 
(Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014; Shah and Cunningham, 2014) I also implement the 
synthetic control method. This method was developed by Abadie et al. (2010) and is a 
generalization of the DD framework, it addresses the possible bias in a DD framework 
that comes from potentially not having a correct control group. Essentially, even if the 
control groups have parallel trends, there could be something inherently different 
about the control group that we are not able to observe which could end up biasing 
the DD estimates. To account for this, synthetic control uses a weighted subset of all 
possible controls, which is selected by matching to the treated group on pre-treatment 
dynamics.  
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When using synthetic controls the estimated effect is the difference between 
the outcome for the treated unit and the synthetic unit. To measure the causal effect I 
estimate:  
𝑌1𝑡 − Σs=2
𝑆+1𝜔𝑠𝑌𝑠𝑡 
Here 𝑌1𝑡  represents the outcome of the treated unit, at time 𝑡, while 𝜔𝑠 stands for 
weights for all control states. These weights represent how much of each state in the 
control pool is contributing to the creation of the counterfactual outcome. Weights 
are calculated using a set of matching covariates which help determine how similar 
states are in the pre-treatment dynamics. An important thing to notice about this 
framework is that all the matching is made on observables and not unobservables.28 
Intuitively, if we are able to match the dynamics before treatment between the 
treatment and control group, then we will be able to predict what would happen in the 
absence of treatment, because we are assuming that nothing else changes.  
For the analysis using administrative data on inpatient hospitalizations, I use a 
DD approach similar to the one presented above. This specification compares 
outcomes before and after the reform in Tennessee to other Southern states. Since I 
do not observe if the individuals who come in have children or not I am not able to 
use the DDD specification I proposed for BRFSS and NHIS. Hence I use the 
following model: 
                                                     
28 However Abadie et al. (2010) mention that when the number of pre-treatment periods is large, 
matching on pre-treatment covariates helps control for any heterogeneity of unobserved and observed 
factors on the outcome in addition to accounting for the unobserved factors that affect the outcome. 
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𝑌𝑑ℎ𝑡𝑠 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑇𝑁 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡) + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑋𝑑ℎ𝑡𝑠 +  𝛿𝑡 +  𝛼𝑠 + 𝜌ℎ + 𝜖ℎ𝑡𝑠 
Where 𝑌 is an outcome for a hospital discharge 𝑑, in hospital ℎ, at time 𝑡, in state 𝑠. 
The estimate of  𝛽1 provides the impact of the reform on outcomes.  𝑋𝑑ℎ𝑡𝑠 is a vector 
of covariates that contains characteristics of the inpatient discharge such as age, age 
squared, sex, race dummies, number of diagnoses, dummies for quartile zip income 
level of the place where the inpatient lives and a set of inpatient risk adjusters.29 In my 
specification, they serve as way to control for patient’s health composition. In addition 
I include year-quarter fixed effects (𝛿𝑡), state-fixed effects (𝛼𝑠) and hospital fixed 
effects (𝜌ℎ). I use hospital fixed effects to account for the unbalanced panel nature of 
NIS; without hospital fixed effects the estimator could be capturing changes in the 
sample of hospitals across years. This is something to be cautious about since the data 
is not state-representative.   
Identification under hospital fixed effects comes from within hospital changes 
in discharge outcomes before and after the reform compared to hospitals in other 
Southern states, allowing for national and state-specific linear trends. 30  The 
identification assumption is that outcomes of inpatients and hospitals in Tennessee 
                                                     
29 These include comorbidities, and All Patient Refined Diagnostic Related Group (APR-DRGs) as 
well as All Patient Severity Diagnostic Related Groups (APS-DRGs). These measures are developed 
by an external organization that helps evaluate the patient before procedures are done and assigns a 
payment category given their health status and conditions. 
30 In an alternative specification I can estimate the model controlling for seasonality and year-quarter 
time trends, however this implies dropping Florida from the control pool since observations in Florida 
do not provide month of quarter date of admission. My preferred specification opts for including 
Florida since it represents 20 percent of the total sample I use.    
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would not have evolved differently from those in other southern states in the absence 
of the reform. Since uninsured individuals might avoid going to the hospital until a 
serious health event occurs, it is plausible that the pool of inpatients after the reform 
are relatively in worse health than the pool of patients before the reform and this could 
be driving changes in outcomes. However, in my preferred specification I do not 
control for this selection mechanism, as I am interested in the effects in the presence 
of this selection, since this is a consequence of the reform.31 For estimation of standard 
errors I also use a modified block bootstrap procedure. 
For all of the analysis above I study the period of 2000-2010, which allows to 
have enough pre and post periods of the reform to credibly identify its effects. 
However, following Garthwaite et al. (2014) I also perform my analysis using the 2000-
2007 to avoid potentially confounding effects from the Great Recession on health 
outcomes (e.g. Tekin et al. 2013; Ruhm, 2000, 2002, and 2005; Cotti et al. 2014). For 
the recession to bias my estimates, the recession would have had to affect the 
differential of childless adults and adults with children in Tennessee differently than it 
                                                     
31 However, for robustness checks I propose two empirical alternatives to account for this selection. 
Ideally we would like to have information on the health status of the patient before any procedures. 
The NIS offer a set of measures of group risk-adjusters that aid in holding patient’s health composition 
constant. I then compare results with and without risk adjuster to understand the degree of selection. 
An alternative to tackling selection is using ICD-9 codes to identify groups of diagnoses that should not 
be affected by health insurance status (urgent procedures) versus procedures that are more likely to be 
avoided if one does not have health insurance or procedures that the patient can have some control on 
the timing (elective procedures). The idea is to identify health shocks that one cannot wait for medical 
attention, and therefore would end up in a hospital admission regardless of health insurance status. NIS 
provides a classification for each discharge on the type of “Urgency”, I used this classification to 
compare discharges that are elective and non-elective. 
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did in other Southern states. Most of the results are robust to this alternative sample 
period. In the results section I point out which outcomes have different implications 
using the shorter period of time.  
5. Data 
In this section, I describe the datasets I used in my analysis. For population level 
outcomes I use two major datasets: the 2000-2010 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS), and restricted versions of the 2000-2010 National Health Interview 
Survey with state identifiers.32 To study the effects of the disenrollment on inpatient 
care, I use the 2000-2010 Nationwide Inpatient Sample.  
5.1. BRFSS and NHIS Survey Data 
BRFSS is an telephone survey that started in 1984. The survey includes 
information on a variety of self-reported health status and health behaviors as a 
monthly repeated cross-section. It also contains standard demographic characteristics 
such as age, race, marital status, education, and – importantly for my study – the 
presence of children in the household. The survey is administered by each state in 
collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which 
compiles information into an annual dataset at the state level. 
                                                     
32 I use the restricted version of the NHIS because the public version does not contain information on 
state of residence and time of interview.  
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NHIS is a cross-sectional household interview survey in which sampling and 
interviewing are continuous throughout the year. The survey contains detailed 
information on health insurance, health access and utilization of medical care. The data 
is collected by interviewers trained at the U.S Bureau of the Census and the survey is 
administered by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and the CDC. This 
survey asks questions about members of the household but it also contains a section 
called “Sample Adult” which selects non-institutionalized individuals over the age of 
18 and asks them more detailed information on their health and health care access. I 
use outcomes from the Household file and the Sample Adult file. For each sample file 
I use the NCHS provided weighing adjustments.33  
These surveys complement each other well. On the one hand BRFSS contains 
a large number of observations which can be identified at the state-month level. Also, 
BRFSS contains several questions on health behaviors and preventive care and the 
questions are consistent over the sample period as opposed to NHIS which only asks 
about certain health behaviors and preventive care in some years. On the other hand, 
NHIS has detailed questions on the type of health insurance (which BRFSS does not 
provide) which is critical information since the reform should have induced predictable 
changes in different types of coverage. In addition NHIS contains questions on health 
access, utilization of medical care, and health spending that BRFSS does not offer. 
                                                     
33 In BRFSS and NHIS, I exclude from the sample individuals age 65 and older since they are eligible 
for Medicare, and I also require individuals to be at least 21 years old. Individuals under this age could 
be covered under their parent’s health insurance and will be less likely to be treated. 
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Since both surveys have their advantages and disadvantages they serve as useful 
complements of each other in studying the effects of the disenrollment.  
I study five categories of outcomes: health care access, preventive care, health 
behaviors, self-assessed health and utilization of medical care. For health care access, 
I study three types of variables. The first variable is health insurance. Using NHIS I 
observe: having any health coverage, Medicaid, Medicare, Private Insurance or other 
type of health insurance.34 In BRFSS, I construct a health coverage variable based on 
the question “Do you have any kind of health care coverage, including health 
insurance, prepaid plans such as HMOs, or government plans such as Medicare?” 
reporting “Yes” to this question is coded as one and “No” is coded as zero. In addition 
in NHIS, for people who report having no health coverage, the surveyors ask 
individuals to give reasons for not having insurance and one of the options is “Losing 
Medicaid”. I use this variable as direct evidence of the disenrollment. The second 
margin on health care access derives from a question that is similarly worded in BRFSS 
and NHIS: “Was there a time in the past 12 months when you needed to see a doctor 
but could not because of cost?” I assign the value of one if the response is yes and 
zero otherwise. In NHIS, I also use the question “During the past 12 months, has 
                                                     
34 Although TennCare was considered to be an extension of Medicaid, it is possible that some people 
thought they had private health insurance even if they had TennCare. In the Appendix B I include an 
example of a TennCare report card, which illustrated how an individual could confuse their reporting 
of TennCare with private health insurance. Given the existing literature which raises the issue of 
misreporting on types of health insurance (Lynch et al. 2003), it is possible that a cleaner measure of 
the reform is a variable measuring having health insurance or not, which can be found both in NHIS 
and BRFSS.  
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medical care been delayed for {person} because of worry about the cost? (Do not 
include dental care)” as a measure of access to medical care. Intuitively, losing health 
insurance means higher costs for most medical care, and therefore I expect an increase 
in the number of occasions that individual decides to forgo or delay medical care due 
to cost. The third margin derives from questions about seeing a doctor. The NHIS 
asks questions regarding seeing a variety of specialist doctors (e.g. pediatrician, mental 
health professional, ophthalmologist, etc.) as well as a general doctor. In BRFSS, I use 
the question “Do you have one person you think of as your personal doctor or health 
care provider?” to study the effect of the disenrollment on seeing a doctor and 
reporting having a doctor as measures of health care access. I expect a decrease in this 
outcome as well.  
For preventive care, I have a total of 8 outcomes, all of which derive from 
questions of the following kind: “In the past 12 months have you had a (Preventive 
Test)_?” I assign the value of one if individuals responded “Yes” and zero if 
individuals responded “No”. 35 For questions about preventive care that are gender 
and age specific, I define the variables only for those that are recommended by the 
United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF). These are having a 
mammogram for women over 50, having a breast exam for women over 21 and having 
                                                     
35  I also create index variables that summarize the information from each separate question of 
preventive care. I construct the index using the method proposed by Anderson (2008). 
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a Pap test for women that are over 21. For men, I code having a PSA test for men 
over 40 and having a rectal exam for men over 40 as well.36  
For health behaviors, I use BRFSS and NHIS questions on alcohol 
consumption, smoking, consumption of fruits and vegetables, and exercise. I create a 
variable named “Physical Activity” which takes the value of one if the individual 
answered “Yes” and zero if the individual answered “No” to questions of performing 
more than 10 minutes of vigorous physical activity.37 There are also several questions 
regarding consumption of fruits and vegetables. I use the information from these 
variables to create a variable representing the average number of daily servings of fruits 
and vegetables. For drinking alcohol, I report three variables. “Binge Drinking” is 
coded one if the individual reported having 5 or more drinks in one occasion in the 
past 30 days. “Any drink in the past 30 days” takes the value of one if the individual 
reported having at least one drink of any alcoholic beverage in the past 30 days. Finally, 
I use a self-reported average of number of alcoholic drinks per occasion to create 
“Drinks per occasion in the past 30 days” variable. I also created a variable named 
“Currently a smoker” which takes the value of one if an individual reported that 
currently he is smoking either every day or some days, and it takes the value of zero 
otherwise. 
                                                     
36 I do not study colonoscopies because the question was introduced in 2004.  
37 In BRFSS “During the past month, other than your regular job, did you participate in any physical 
activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening, or walking for exercise?” and in 
NHIS is “How often do you do vigorous leisure-time physical activities for at least 10 minutes that 
cause heavy sweating or large increases in breathing or heart rate?” and similarly for moderate activity.   
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For health outcomes I use questions in both BRFSS and NHIS regarding self-
rated health and number of days being sick.38 The first question asks individuals to rate 
their health from 1-5, 5 being excellent and 1 being a poor level of health. I use as 
outcomes the probabilities of reporting each level. Each variable takes the value of 1 
if in the respective category and 0 if not.39 Second, I use a question that asks individuals 
to report the number of days they had bad physical health (BRFSS), bad mental health 
(BRFSS), and any type of bad health that prevented them from performing daily tasks 
or made them miss work (BRFSS and NHIS). I use each outcome in two ways. First, 
I use the raw variable reporting the number of days. Second, I create a variable that 
takes the value of one if they reported a positive number of days and zero otherwise.  
 For utilization of medical care, I use questions from NHIS regarding changes 
in the usual place of medical care, place of care the respondent goes when sick, number 
of times in the Emergency Department, and number of times spent overnight in a 
hospital.  
In Table 1, I present summary statistics for Tennessee and other Southern 
states using BRFSS. Most of the variables across both groups are similar and not 
statistically different from each other. Notably, the health insurance rate was 8 
percentage points higher in Tennessee than in other southern states before the reform; 
                                                     
38 The advantage of using self-assessed health is that it encompasses all the potential health related 
problems, including those that a physician may not observe.  
39 I focus on the extreme ratings since recent evidence by Greene et al. (2015) mention that the middle 
ratings are usually inflated. In addition, there has been recent research that has suggested using ordered 
probit for this specific outcome (Contoyannis et al. 2004) I have estimated these models as well and the 
results are similar to the linear probability model.  
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this difference reduces to 4 percent after the reform. Tennessee has less reporting of 
forgone medical care and higher reporting of people having a personal doctor, which 
is consistent with the higher insurance rates.40 In Table 2, I present summary statistics 
for Tennessee and other southern stats using NHIS. [Fill in]  
5.2. NIS Inpatient Data 
I expand my analysis of changes in inpatient stays by using the Nationwide 
Inpatient Sample (NIS). These data are a nationally representative database developed 
by the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) that is the largest publicly 
available all-payer inpatient healthcare database in the U.S. These data contain 
information on inpatient discharges from community hospitals. Given the period used 
in this analysis (2000-2010) the design of NIS contains the universe of discharges from 
a sample of community hospitals. 41 The sample of hospitals aims at representing 20 
percent of a stratified sample of all U.S community hospitals. This amounts to 5 to 8 
million hospitals stays each year coming from about 1000 hospitals. The NIS provides 
information on both hospitals (location, teaching status, size, ownership type, number 
of discharges, etc.) and patient discharge characteristics (payment type, diagnosis, 
                                                     
40 In Appendix Table 1 I show a table of summary statistics for demographic characteristics. Comparing 
pre-reform means across Tennessee and other southern states the difference that is most stark is the 
racial composition of Tennessee (much less Hispanic than other southern states) and the percent of 
high school graduates and some college is bigger in Tennessee than other southern states. I take into 
account this observables difference by controlling for race and levels of education for each individual 
in my regression specifications. 
41 Community hospitals are all non-federal, short-term general, and other specialty hospitals, excluding 
hospitals units of institutions. Ninety percent of all hospitals in the U.S are considered community 
hospitals. Examples of non-community hospitals are hospitals for prison inmates or veterans’ hospitals.  
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length of stay, cost of stay, admission type, etc.). Notably it also contains month of 
admission, which is particularly useful since the reform was implemented over the 
course of 8 months (August 2005 to May 2006). Therefore given the relatively large 
sample sizes in each monthly bin, these data allow me to identify changes at the 
monthly level and to compare outcomes before the reform, during the reform and 
after its full implementation.  
There are two major limitation with these data. First, they are designed to be 
nationally representative, but are not designed to be representative at the state-level. 
Second, NIS contains data on inpatient visits. Regarding these limitations, this paper 
offers analyses of the reform with other population-based outcomes, which 
complements the results found with the NIS data.  
For this analysis, I use all discharges from hospitals for years 2000 through 
2010 that are located in the South, as defined by the U.S Census. Since not all states 
report to the HCUP database, this pool of states is composed of Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and West 
Virginia.42 I exclude patients over the age of 65 and under the age of 20, since both of 
these populations were not directly targeted by the reform. In Table 3 I provide 
statistics that describe the NIS data. The final sample consist of 1583 hospitals over 
the span of 11 years (2000-2010), this equals a total of 3,155,042 of inpatient discharge 
                                                     
42 I also estimated the analysis excluding Virginia, Oklahoma and Texas. The first two states come in 
and out in the sample over this period. Texas has non-trivial differences in the way they report it reports 
its outcomes compared to the rest of the states. 
38 
 
records. The average appearance per hospital is 3.8 times over the 11 years, hence it is 
an unbalanced panel. Comparing Medicaid rates before and after the reform in 
Tennessee I find a 5 percent decline, while in other Southern states I find a 10 percent 
increase. I also find there is a decrease in the percentage of admission coming from 
the ED in Tennessee of about 2 percent, which is much smaller than the 11 percent 
decrease experienced by other Southern states.  
6. Results 
In this section I describe the main findings of the effects of the disenrollment on 
health. I show that the disenrollment decreased overall health insurance rates, which 
in turn decreased access to care. I then show decreases in health status and how 
changes in the places where people obtain care. 
6.1. How did the disenrollment affect health insurance rates? 
I begin by providing evidence of the reform, namely that there is an increase in 
reporting having “lost Medicaid”. I complement evidence from this outcomes by 
reporting the effects of the reform on having Medicaid and any health insurance.  
To show graphically the effect of the reform, I use BRFSS data to plot a graph 
of health insurance rates.43 Figure 2 illustrates that before the disenrollment the two 
demographic groups within each state move similarly, but once the reform occurs the 
group of childless adults in Tennessee majorly diverges from the group of adults with 
                                                     
43 I use BRFSS since it has a larger sample size and reporting is in monthly bins  
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children in Tennessee. Notably, there is no divergence between childless adults and 
adults with children in other Southern states.44 After 2009 there is another visible drop 
in the health coverage rate for childless adults possibly driven by the recession. In 
which case the 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 × 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 coefficient should take into account any 
national trend that affects childless adults and adults with children differently for each 
year. Relatedly, the results on health insurance rates are consistent when I restrict the 
sample to end in 2007.      
In Table 4, I present the results from different specifications using data from 
BRFSS and NHIS to provide evidence of the disenrollment. The first three panels are 
specifications based on the DD models and the bottom panel is based on the DDD. 
The columns represent different outcomes: the first three columns are outcomes from 
NHIS while the last column is an outcome from BRFSS.  
I first look at the effects of the reform on the likelihood of reporting having 
lost Medicaid. I take this as the most direct evidence of the reform. The estimate in 
the first row and column of Table 4 is the DD estimator for the full sample, which 
indicates that the TennCare reform increased the likelihood of reporting having lost 
Medicaid by 1.1 percentage points. I then proceed to estimate the DD by the sample 
of adult with children and adult without children. I expect the effect to be mostly 
driven by the sample of childless adults. When I estimate the same model using the 
sample of adults with children (second panel) and childless adults (third panel) it is 
                                                     
44 Since the sample size for NHIS is smaller the data contains more noise.  
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noticeable that the DD effect for the full sample is driven by the sample of childless 
adults. In the DDD model, I estimate a significant 1.8 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of report of losing Medicaid. This represents a 128 percent increase over 
the pre-reform mean.  
Since not everyone gets asked the question on losing Medicaid, I use reporting 
on having Medicaid. The second column provides the estimates on reporting having 
any Medicaid as health coverage. In the DD full sample model, I estimate a 2.8 
percentage point reduction in the probability of reporting having Medicaid. When 
comparing across sub-samples for the DD, the full sample effect is mainly driven by 
the sample of childless adults. The DDD specification estimated a significant 2.7 
percentage point reduction in the probability of reporting Medicaid, which represents 
a 30 percent reduction over the mean. These findings confirm a strong treatment effect 
of the reform.  
Since it is possible that people who were dropped could have been able to 
obtain other sources of insurance, in columns 3 and 4 I estimate the effects of the 
reform on overall health insurance rates. In both datasets, when comparing the DD 
estimates by sub-sample it is clear that the effect is mainly driven by the sample of 
adults without children. Focusing on the DDDs, using the NHIS I estimate a 
statistically significant 4.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of reporting being 
uninsured, which represents a 32 percent increase over the mean. Using BRFSS, the 
DDD specification estimates a 1.7 percentage point reduction in the probability of 
41 
 
having any type of insurance, which represents a 2 percent reduction over the mean. 
Both of these estimates are statistically significant.45  
In 2004, childless adults represented 52% of all adults in Tennessee between 
the ages of 21 to 64. Using the estimates from the DDD models I find a decline in 
health insurance rates of 4.5 (NHIS) and 1.7 (BRFSS) percentage points. These effects 
translate into approximately 34,000 to 97,750 residents – about 20 to 57 percent of 
people losing eligibility - who did not get other types of coverage.46 
Finally, I present evidence of the existence of the reform using the Synthetic 
Control Method for health insurance. I present the results using BRFSS since it has a 
larger sample size. 47  I graphically present the main results in Figure 3. For this 
                                                     
45 In the appendix I explore how the reform affected the probabilities of reporting other types of health 
insurance. Using NHIS I find evidence of increases in reporting private insurance for the DD, but this 
effect is small and statistically insignificant. Using the DDD I estimate a 3.21 percentage point decline 
in reporting private coverage. This effect is statistically significant using the clustered standard errors 
but is not statistically significant using the block bootstrap p-values. It is possible that since people 
under TennCare were covered by managed care it is possible that individuals were reporting losing 
private health insurance as opposed to Medicaid when ask the question about their insurance. In 
Appendix B I provide a TennCare card example which can illustrate the confusion when reporting 
health insurance. If this hypothesis is true I should find changes in private-payment types in NIS data, 
since these are records that come from the hospital administrative data and therefore are less likely to 
be contaminated the confusion in reporting. Using NIS data, I do not find a significant change in the 
rate of private payments. I also find a reduction of 0.01 percentage points in reporting having Medicare. 
In the NHIS results it is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. I also present results for other 
reasons for not having health coverage. Most of the effects are not statistically, significant and the largest 
coefficient is for the losing Medicaid outcome. 
46 These estimates are larger than those provided by Garthwaite et al. (2014): they estimated a decline 
in public coverage of 3.6 percentage points in their DDD specification and 4.6 percentage points in 
their DD model. However it is expected that their estimates are different since they are estimated from 
the differences between being publicly covered and having no coverage. They estimated the crowd-out 
effect, the ratio of the decrease in public coverage to the increase in private coverage, to be about 36.2%. 
Using Garthwaite et al. estimates on private coverage, their results imply a decline in overall health 
insurance coverage of 2.9 percentage points for the DD model and 1.4 percentage points for the DDD 
specification. 
47 The results for this method using NHIS can be found in the appendix, the results are similar. 
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estimation I use all states as my donor pool, however I have also restricted the donor 
pool to Southern states as I do in the DD framework. The results are similar and can 
be found in Appendix C. The synthetic Tennessee’s outcomes diverge significantly 
from actual Tennessee’s outcomes after 2005, the year of disenrollment. The estimated 
effect of disenrollment on health insurance coverage is a reduction of 3.48 percentage 
points. This estimate is higher than the one obtained from the DD analysis but 
strengthens the evidence on the effects of disenrollment. 
For the rest of the paper I only show results from my preferred specification, 
the DDD. In addition I will estimate this specification using the full-sample and using 
a sample of low-educated individuals (high school degree or less) and high-educated 
individuals (above high school degree). The idea behind the sub-sampling is that the 
population of low educated individuals would be more likely be affected by the reform 
since they are more likely to have income under 400% of the federal poverty line. In 
Table 5, I estimate the results using the sub-samples of low and high educated. I 
estimate that the probability of having Medicaid falls by 4.8 percentage points among 
low educated while for the high educated sample it falls 1.5 percentage point. This 
corroborates the reform having a higher impact on the low educated sample than its 
counterpart.  
6.2. Mechanism of the Losing Health Insurance of Health Status 
This section studies the effects of the disenrollment on health care access, preventive 
care, and health behaviors. These are all potential mechanisms on how the 
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disenrollment could affect health outcomes. I find evidence of decreases in health 
care access, increases in the likelihood of having a flu vaccine and suggestive 
evidence of reductions in risky health behaviors and increases in positive health 
behaviors. I do not find consistent evidence in changes in preventive care measures 
related to cancer detection.   
6.2.1. Effects on Health Care Access  
In order for losing health insurance to affect one's health care decisions and health it 
should be the case that losing health insurance reduces health care access as a result of 
increased cost. In this section I document that the reform increased reporting of 
forgone and delayed medical care specifically due to cost. In addition I also provide 
evidence of a reduction in the probability of reporting seeing a general care physician.  
Table 6 explores the effects of the reform on health care access. Panel A 
presents results for health care access variables from NHIS while Panel B resents 
results for variables in BRFSS. The first outcome is forgone or delay medical care due 
to cost. It represents the probability of not going to see a doctor when needed because 
of cost, which is one of the main mechanisms through which lack of insurance affects 
health.48 The full sample DDD estimates an effect of 3.2 (NHIS) and 1.3 (BRFSS) 
percentage points. This represents a 30 to 10 percent effect over the mean, 
respectively. The estimates for BRFSS are statistically significant only using the cluster-
                                                     
48 There is a potential problem with the timing component of this question, but given the set-up of the 
DD, we should still be able to detect effects. I have also tried a specification in which the DD is not 
binary but a fraction representing the possible amount of months treated by the reform, the results 
from this variation are similar to this specification. 
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adjustment while the estimates from NHIS are significant under both standard error 
adjustments. In column 2 and 3, I re-estimate the model using the sample of people 
with a high school degree or less and people with more than a high school level of 
education. Comparing the estimates from the sample of less educated to more 
educated, I find that the low-educated sample has a larger increase on the probability 
of reporting forgone medical care then the high-educated sample in both datasets. The 
probability of reporting forgone medical care among the low educated group increases 
by 4.2 percentage points in NHIS and 3.8 percentage points in BRFSS. Both estimates 
are statistically significant for both inference methods. When looking at the higher 
educated sample, I find an increase of 2.3 percentage points in NHIS and a very small 
(0.7 percentage points) decline in BRFSS, in both cases this effect is significant under 
the cluster standard error adjustment. I next study the effects of the reform on the 
probability of reporting not being able to afford prescription drugs. I find a 1.9 
percentage point increase for the full sample and a 4.4 percentage point increase for 
the low educated sample. These estimates represent a 17 percent and 40 percent for 
the low educated sample.  
Finally, I can study the effects on seeing a general care physician (NHIS) or 
having a general check-up in the past 12 months (BRFSS). In both datasets I find 
negative coefficients across the full sample and the breakdown by education. The 
effect is also larger for the low-educated sample than the high-educated sample, 
following the pattern observed in the previous health access variable. All of this effects 
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are statistically significant under the cluster procedure but not significant under the 
block bootstrap procedure. For the full-sample, these effects translate to a 2.8 to 4 
percent decrease in the probability of seeing a general care physician.  
6.2.2. Effects on Preventive Care 
Delaying or forgoing medical care can be problematic for individuals with 
chronic health conditions since the lack of medical checks can cause delay in treatment 
and ultimately increase health risk. Another potential implication of avoiding medical 
care is that one can have fewer opportunities for getting preventive care. I find 
evidence of increases in the likelihood of getting a flu vaccine. I do not find consistent 
effects of preventive care related to cancer detections and cholesterol checks.   
In Table 7, I use BRFSS to study the effects of the reform on preventive care. 
In Panel A, I report outcomes reflecting preventive care of interest to the whole 
population such as receiving flu vaccine and having a cholesterol check. In Panel B I 
report on preventive care for women and in Panel C I report on preventive care for 
men over the age of 40.  
I find that the disenrollment is associated with a statistically significant 2.7 
percentage point increase on likelihood of having a flu shot, which represents an 8 
percent increase over the mean.49 This effect is consistent over the low and high 
educated sample, however it is larger and statistically significant only for the high 
educated sample. Although this results might be counterintuitive, it could reflect moral 
                                                     
49 In a result not reported the same outcomes variable in NHIS had a coefficient of 2.9 percentage point 
increase with a 9 percent increase over the mean 
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hazard. Since people are losing health insurance, they are more likely to invest in low-
cost prevention such as the flu shot since the expected cost of getting the flu are higher 
without health insurance. Barbaresco et al. (2015) found decreases in having flu shots 
when individuals gain insurance under the ACA dependent coverage provision. I also 
find negative effects on the probability of having a cholesterol check, although this 
effect is only statistically significant using the clustered standard errors in the full and 
high-educated sample.  
In Panel B I study the effects on preventive care for women. The age reference 
in each outcomes follows the age recommendations for each preventive care measure 
provided by the USPSTF. Most of these coefficients are relatively small in size and not 
statistically significant. I only find statistical significance using the clustered standard 
error for the coefficient on breast exam, which represents a decrease of 2.3 percentage 
points or a 3 percent increase over the mean.  
In Panel C, I study the effects on preventive care for men over 40.50 I find that 
the disenrollment is associated with a 6.3 percentage point reduction in having a 
(Prostate-specific antigen) PSA exam for the low educated sample, which is significant 
using the cluster procedure. I also find a 4.1 percentage point increase in having a PSA 
exam for the high educated sample: again, this coefficient is only significant using the 
cluster procedure. 
                                                     
50 The reference age was the only possible reference since that this is how it was asked in BRFSS. 
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6.2.3. Effect on Health Behaviors 
The results provide mixed evidence on the effects of the disenrollment on 
preventive care. The only consistent significant result is the increase in having a flu 
shot which could be an indication of moral hazard. The idea is that when individuals 
lose health insurance they will be more likely to adopt behaviors to improve their 
health, since negative health shocks can induce costs that are no longer mitigated by 
health insurance. A possible way to investigate presence of moral hazard is to study 
health behaviors. 51  In Table 8, I study the effect of the disenrollment on health 
behaviors using BRFSS outcomes. The first panel shows a summary measure that 
includes information of risky and non-risky health behaviors. Following a 
methodology in Anderson (2008) that helps correct for multiple inference, I create an 
index which higher scores represent engagement in more positive health behaviors or 
less risky health behaviors. I study each behavior separately in Panel B and C. The 
estimates from panel A indicate that for the full sample there is an increase an overall 
improvement in health behaviors but this effect is not statistically significant. For the 
low educated sample it is also positive and statistically significant. For the high 
educated sample I find that the reform is associated with a statistically significant 
decline in the index. The size of this effect can be interpreted as changes in a z-score 
measure. Taken together, the results from Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with and 
suggestive of the presence of moral hazard for low educated individuals but not for 
                                                     
51 Carpenter and Tello-Trillo (2015) provide evidence of moral hazard using health behaviors from the 
same data.    
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high educated individuals. It is important to note that changes in health behaviors need 
not necessarily be consistent with only a moral hazard argument since reduction in 
smoking and drinking could be driven by changes in the current budget constraint that 
were driven by lack of insurance. 
6.3. Are people getting sicker?  
In this section I study how the reform affects health status. In order to understand the 
effects of the disenrollment on population health I study two measures of population 
health: self-rated health and days with some sickness.  
Arguably the main disadvantage of self-rated health is that it is a subjective measure 
and it could be representing changes in the individual’s well-being rather than clinical 
health outcomes. However it also encompasses all potential health problems observed 
by individuals and not observed by a physician. Previous studies have shown that this 
measure correlates with objective measures of health outcomes (DeSalvo et al., 2005; 
Idler et al., 1997) and mortality (Bound, 1991; Burstrom and Fredlund, 2001; Mossey 
and Shapiro, 1982). In addition, this is a widely studied measure of health which helps 
compares estimates across policies. Table 9 presents the results on probability of 
reporting excellent health, and reporting fair or poor health.52 In Panel A, I study the 
outcomes using NHIS. I find that the disenrollment is associated with an increase in 
                                                     
52 The probit version of this specification as well as the ordered probit are available in the online 
appendix, all of the results presented in here have the same interpretation as those found in the non-
linear models.  
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the likelihood of reporting excellent health of about 2.6 percentage points for the full 
sample and it is of similar size and sign for the low and high educated sample. These 
effects are statistically significant using the cluster procedure but not the bootstrap 
procedure.  In addition, I estimate a decrease in the probability of reporting fair and 
poor health of about 1.4 percentage points for the full sample and more than double 
for the low educated sample. Similarly, these coefficients are only significant under the 
cluster procedure. In contrast to these results, using the BRFSS I estimate a decrease 
in the probability of reporting excellent health of 0.5 percentage points, and an increase 
in the probability of reporting fair and poor health of 0.9 percentage points. These 
estimates are significant using the cluster procedure but not the bootstrap procedure. 
Even though the effects do not seem to be significant, the magnitudes and signs of 
the coefficients across both surveys are puzzling, especially given the consistency 
across the first stage. As I do with all outcomes, I have estimated the specifications 
with the set of years 2000-2007 to account for any potential confounding from the 
recession. When I estimate these outcomes on those set of years, the coefficient on 
reporting excellent health for NHIS becomes negative (and remains insignificant) 
across all of the samples. However the coefficient in reporting fair or poor health 
remains negative. It is possible that the reporting of this measure is being affected by 
conditions of well-being that are not related to health.53 Given the inconsistency of 
                                                     
53 Another hypothesis could be that individual know less about their current health status since they 
have stopped going to the doctor and this is why we observe improvements in health. The problem 
with this hypothesis is that this doesn’t explain the difference between BRFSS and NHIS. 
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these results across surveys, I move to analyze arguably more “objective” measures of 
health such as number of days sick.  
In Table 10 Panel A, I report estimates for the number of days over the past 
12 months in bed due to sickness. In Panel B, I study the number of days over the 
past 12 months with bad physical health, bad mental health and days when the 
respondent was incapacitated. In Panel A, I find that the reform is associated with an 
increase of 0.6 days in the number of days in bed for the full sample, a 13 percent 
increase. This effect is much larger - 1.6 days - for the sample of low educated 
individuals, a 30 percent increase over the mean. These results are statistically 
significant with the cluster procedure but not the block bootstrap adjustment. In Panel 
B, I find evidence of a small and insignificant decrease in bad physical health for the 
full sample but a 7 percent increase for the low educated sample, which is significant 
using the clustered standard errors. I also find positive coefficients on days of bad 
mental health. Finally, I find statistically significant increases in the number of days 
incapacitated: there is a 17 percent increase for the full sample, a statistically significant 
25 percent increase for the low educated sample. 
The evidence brought in Table 8 is much more consistent relative to the results 
on self-assessed health ratings and provides evidence of a decrease in health, especially 
for the low educated sample.            
51 
 
6.4. What kind of care do sick people use? 
I now study how health care utilization changes after the disenrollment. I present 
evidence that people report changing their place of care because of their health 
insurance, as well as evidence that people increase reporting using the ED as their 
place of usual care. I then report increases in visits to the ED and decreases in the total 
number of nights stayed in the hospital. I further explore this decrease in number of 
nights in the hospital by studying administrative hospital data. 
In Table 11 I use NHIS to study changes in place of usual medical care when 
sick. First I study if individuals change their health care place due to health insurance. 
I find that the disenrollment is associated with a 1.9 percentage point increase in the 
probability of changing their place of care due to health insurance. This effect is 
stronger for the low educated sample, I find a 3.9 percentage point increase. Both of 
these outcomes are statistically significant with any of the standard error adjustment. 
The second outcome is reporting having a usual place of care. I find a positive 
association across the three samples, however these effects are only statistical 
significant using the clustered standard errors. Given the results from these two 
outcomes, it is possible that individuals still consider they have a place of care, but that 
the place has changed. In Panel B, I investigate what type of places individuals report 
being their usual place of care. Focusing on the low-educated sample, I find that 
individuals are more likely to use clinics and Emergency Departments as their source 
of usual care and less likely to use the doctor’s office. These effects are significant 
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using the clustered standard errors. In contrast, for the high-educated sample, which 
may have more means of obtaining care, they are more likely to report clinics or the 
doctor’s office as their source of usual care and less likely to report emergency 
departments as their source of usual care.  
Changing place of care is a key part of the story on how health care utilization 
changes. In Table 12 I explore in more detail changes to health care utilization. In 
terms of Emergency Department use, I find consistent patterns with the previous 
findings. Low educated people are more likely to use the Emergency Department while 
high educated people are less likely to use it. For the low educated, I find a 6.8 percent 
increase in the probability of using the ED and a similar effect on the number of times 
in the ED. For the high educated I find a 9.5 percent decrease in the probability of 
using an ED and similar for the number of times in the ED.  
Another margin to study health care utilization is to study procedures that are 
more complicated than just visiting the ED. These involve surgeries or procedures 
where the patient needs to stay overnight. The next outcomes in Table 12 focus on 
these outcomes related to more intensive procedures. I find significant effects under 
clustered standard errors for the full and low-educated sample, I find a 23 percent 
decrease in the likelihood of having a surgery for the full sample, and a 49 percent 
decrease for the low educated sample.  
I then study the effect on the likelihood of having an inpatient admission. All 
the coefficients are positive but they are not statistically significant. I also study the 
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outcomes of number of times being an inpatient in the past 12 months, I find for the 
full sample a reduction of about 10 percent, and a reduction of 44 percent for the low 
educated sample. Finally, I study the average number of nights spent overnight in a 
hospital. I find a statistically significant increase of almost 2 days for the low educated 
sample and a reduction of 2.8 days for the high educated sample. These results provide 
evidence that there are non-trivial differences across low and high educated samples, 
potentially since high educated individuals are more likely to have other means to get 
medical care.  
6.4.1. Effects on Inpatient Visits  
In order to complement the findings on utilization, I use the Nationwide Inpatient 
Sample to study the effects on the number of inpatient stays. The full sample from 
these regressions comes from discharges for individuals ages 21 to 64 in hospitals of 
Southern states for years 2000 to 2010. 
I start by presenting evidence of the reform (fewer people reporting Medicaid) 
using NIS data. I can investigate the effects of the reform by looking at the type of 
payment the hospital received for each discharge. The six payment categories are: 
Medicaid, Medicare, private, self-pay, no charge and other types of payment. Since NIS 
provides information on primary and secondary payment information, I am able to 
analyze changes in payment composition as well as change in overall type of payments. 
The most direct prediction from the TennCare disenrollment would be a reduction in 
Medicaid payments for hospitals in Tennessee compared to hospitals in other southern 
states. In Table 13 I present the results of changes in payment structure using different 
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payment measures. I estimate a significant 19 percent decrease in the likelihood of 
having providing Medicaid as the source of payment. For private coverage I also find 
a decrease in coverage of about 6 percent. In terms of self-payment, I see an increase 
in this category of about 30 percent. This provides further evidence that the 
composition of payments for inpatient stays was changing drastically after the 
disenrollment.  
In Table 14, I present evidence of the effects of the reform on the number of 
discharges. These regressions come from analyzing the data at the hospital quarter 
level. I estimate that after the reform there are approximately 86 fewer discharges per 
hospital quarter, and this amounts to a 22 percent reduction over the mean. When 
dividing the effect into discharges by age groups, I estimate that 91 percent of this 
decrease is attributed to non-elderly adults. Using the sample of non-elderly discharges, 
I estimate a 43 percent decline in discharges. This complements the findings from 
NHIS that demonstrates decreases in the number of times a person has been an 
inpatient.           
7. Discussion and Conclusion  
In this paper I have provided the literature's first evidence on the effects of losing 
public health insurance eligibility on population health outcomes. I find that the 2005 
Tennessee Medicaid disenrollment significantly decreased health care access by 
making people less likely to see a doctor. Since the doctor can recommend certain tests 
or check-ups, one would expect individuals to have less preventive care as a result, but 
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I do not find strong evidence for changes in preventive care with the exception of 
having a flu shot.54 This could indicate that individuals are willing to invest in low-cost 
preventive care to avoid getting sick in the future since the expected cost of being sick 
has now increased. This indicates the presence of moral hazard and it is highlighted by 
the adoption of positive health behaviors (eating healthier and exercising) and 
reduction of harmful health behaviors (drinking and smoking). If individuals take 
better care of themselves this could be a channel through which the disenrollment can 
improve their health rather than decrease it.55 In contrast, I also find evidence for 
decreases in health care access which can lead to negative health outcomes. Even with 
these two conflicting effects, I find evidence that the reform significantly decreased 
health. Since not everyone who lost public health insurance eligibility remained 
uninsured, the effects identified by the research design are average effects, which 
implies that there were some people for which the reform had a substantial negative 
impact on their health. To illustrate this possibility, we should think of an individual 
who had an episode of sickness. Their health will start to deteriorate, and the rate at 
which this happens can be accentuated by the fact that the individual avoids going to 
the doctor because of cost and not having access to prescription drugs. This potentially 
                                                     
54 This is a mixed problem of precision and economic significance. For example for Mammograms in 
the full sample, the effect is about 1 percent decrease over the mean, but the confidence interval also 
include effects of about 10 percent. However for Pap Exams we can rule out effects bigger than 1.6 
percent with the clustered standard errors 
55 Note that changes in health behaviors need not only to be explained by moral hazard argument, one 
could also hypothesize that losing health insurance could affect people’s budget constraint which makes 
them less likely to drink or smoke. In either case, this is a mechanism of how losing health insurance 
could be affecting health behaviors and in turn health outcomes.  
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leads to a more severe decrease in his or her health. Once an individual decides to get 
medical care the place where he/she receives it may not be the same. I estimate that 
approximately 30 percent of individuals affected by the reform change their place of 
care specifically due to health insurance reasons. These individuals are less likely to 
report the doctor's office or HMO provider as their source of usual care and more 
likely to use either emergency departments, hospital outpatient department or clinics. 
This last finding refers to people reporting what is their source of usual care, but I also 
investigate if they actually use ED more. I find that the likelihood of going to the ED 
increases, about a 7 percent increase for the low-educated individuals. This increase of 
ED attendance occurs in the extensive and intensive margin. I also find evidence of 
decreases in the number of surgeries and the probability of having a surgery. This in 
accordance with the findings from the administrative data which I estimate to have a 
40 percent reduction in non-elderly discharges. That is, individuals who have some 
leverage of choosing whether or not to get a procedure or the timing of the procedure 
would be less likely to get it because of the increased cost. This could imply larger 
negative health effects in the long-run or simply that the individuals could have had 
better health during the current period if they had health insurance. 
These results are subject to some limitations. First, the survey outcomes are 
self-reported; however, there is substantial research that indicates self-reported health 
outcomes and objective health outcomes are strongly correlated. Also, I control for 
sources of reporting heterogeneity such as income, age and gender (Zierbarth, 2010). 
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Second, I am not able to pin down all the mechanisms of how losing health insurance 
affects health other than forgone medical care and changes in health behaviors; it is 
possible that there are other mechanisms which I am not able to identify.  For instance, 
given that the TennCare disenrollment increased employment (Garthwaite et al., 
2014), it is possible that part of my effects can be driven by the gain in employment 
that the reform caused.56   
Nevertheless, this is the first paper to study the effects of a sizeable public 
health insurance disenrollment on health care access, preventive care, health behaviors, 
health care utilization and self-assessed health. In doing so, I provide evidence of 
potential mechanism of how the disenrollment could affect health outcomes and 
subsequent health care utilization. Most of these results are consistent across two 
population representative surveys as well as administrative data on hospitalizations. In 
addition, my study focuses on a largely understudied population which ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion explicitly targets: childless adults. My results provide evidence that 
losing health insurance is significantly detrimental for health care access and health. It 
also induces the use of ED and reduces the demand for surgeries. Further research 
should focus on other aspects of the effects of the disenrollment, such as the time they 
remain uninsured, more detailed information on the effects on prescription drugs and 
how losing health insurance affects the household consumption bundle. Finally, for 
                                                     
56 For the purposes of policy-making it is important to highlight that the counterfactual world I am 
currently comparing is Tennessee without disenrollment and implicitly without its budget deficit. In a 
true counterfactual world, Tennessee would have taken an alternative action in order to deal with the 
budget deficit.  
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welfare analysis, another relevant set of outcomes to study would be the effects of the 
reform on the supply side of health (i.e. wages of health practitioners, their hours 
worked, etc.). This will help us have a more complete picture on the broad effects of 
this particular disenrollment, which eventually can help inform policy-makers when 
making choices about changes to public health insurance eligibility and other 
alternatives policies.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Main Outcomes 2000-2010 BRFSS Data
TN Before Southern States
Before
TN After Southern States
After
Total
Health Access
Has Health Insurance 0.87 0.79 0.82 0.78 0.79
Forgone Medical Care in the past 12 months 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18
Had a General Check-up in the past 12 months 0.76 0.69 0.74 0.67 0.68
Health Status
Pr(Reporting Excellent Health) 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.22
Pr(Fair and Poor Self-reported Health) 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15
Number of Days Physical Health Not Good 3.36 3.27 4.10 3.45 3.38
Number of Days Mental Health Not Good 3.42 3.63 3.66 3.82 3.72
Number of Days Incapacitated by Bad Health 4.34 4.03 5.90 4.51 4.32
Health Behaviors
Participates in Physical Activity 0.70 0.74 0.72 0.75 0.74
Daily Servings of Fruits and Vegetables 4.21 3.61 3.74 3.67 3.66
Binge Drinking 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.15
Any Drink in past 30 Days 0.35 0.53 0.33 0.52 0.51
Avr. Drinks per Occassion is past 30 Days 0.81 1.32 0.76 1.29 1.28
Currently a Smoker 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.24
BMI Adjusted 27.73 27.51 28.69 28.25 27.88
Preventive Care
Had Flu Shot in the past 12 months 0.28 0.24 0.34 0.31 0.28
Had a Blood Cholesterol check in the past 12 months 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.79 0.78
Had a Mammogram in the past 12 months for women over 50 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64
Had a Breast Exam in the past 12 months for women over 21 0.74 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.67
Had a Pap Exam in the past 12 months for women over 21 0.75 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.67
Ever had a Prostate Specific Antigen Test for men over 40 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.59 0.57
Ever had a Rectal exam for men over 40 0.67 0.71 0.57 0.70 0.70
Chidless Status
Currently Pregnant 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
No Children in the Household under age of 18 0.54 0.51 0.53 0.49 0.50
Number of Children 0.86 0.93 0.88 0.99 0.96
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Main Outcomes 2000-2010 NHIS Data
TN Before Southern States
Before
TN After Southern States
After
Total
Health Access
Uninsured Rate 0.14 0.23 0.20 0.25 0.23
Has Medicaid 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.05
Has Lost Medicaid in the past 12 months 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
Forgone Medical Care in the past 12 months 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.09
Has seen a doctor in the past 12 months 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.64
Health Status
Pr(Reporting Excellent Health) 0.26 0.32 0.25 0.30 0.31
Pr(Fair and Poor Self-reported Health) 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.12
Number of Days Missed from Work 5.23 4.69 4.85 4.00 4.42
Number of Days Spent in Bed 7.11 4.86 6.98 5.26 5.15
Medical Care
Change Health Care Place due to Health Insurance 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
Has an Usual Place of Care 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.79 0.81
Place of Usual Care
Clinic 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Doctor’s Office or HMO 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.62 0.65
Emergency Department 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Hospital Outpatient Department 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other Place 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Health Care Utilization
Visited the ED 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21
Number of Times in ED in past 12 months | ED Visit==1 1.59 1.59 1.69 1.62 1.61
Had an Overnight Stay in the Hospital in the past 12 Months 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Number of Overnights Stays 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
Average Number of Nights per Stay 3.45 4.11 3.96 4.28 4.16
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Main Outcomes 2000-2010 NIS Data
TN Before Southern States
Before
TN After Southern States
After
Total
Payment Type
Any Insurance 0.94 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.89
Medicaid 0.38 0.24 0.33 0.29 0.27
Medicare 0.20 0.16 0.24 0.18 0.17
Private 0.52 0.54 0.46 0.50 0.52
Self Pay 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.18
No charge 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
Other Type of Payment 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.05
Missing Information 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Hospital Level
Number of Hospitals 98 1060 91 1161 1583
Average Number of Discharges Per Hospital 23502 23815 20718 19983 22423
Average Total Charges in $millions 17,922 19,925 23,367 24,308 21,437
Number of diagnoses on this record 5.28 5.52 7.52 6.96 6.05
Number of procedures on this record 1.69 1.58 1.72 1.69 1.63
Discharge Type
Emergency 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.46
Urgent 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.22
Elective 0.37 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.31
Discharge Admission
ED Admission 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.34 0.43
Routine Admission 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.62 0.53
Transfer Admission 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04
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Table 4: Effects Disenrollment on Health Insurance Coverage Using BRFSS and NHIS 2000-2010
Lost Medicaid Medicaid Uninsured Health Coverage
DD Model, All Adults NHIS NHIS NHIS BRFSS
TN X Post 0.011 -0.028 0.043 -0.031
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.002}
[0.012] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R-Square 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.16
N 193,086 193,086 193,086 841,757
DD model, sample with children < 18
TN X Post 0.005 -0.009 0.013 -0.026
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
{0.115} {0.008} {0.019} {0.003}
[0.464] [0.332] [0.291] [0.005]
R-Square 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.19
N 76,227 76,227 76,227 355,693
DD model, sample without children < 18
TN X Post 0.014 -0.030 0.052 -0.036
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.003}
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R-Square 0.01 0.07 0.15 0.14
N 113,610 113,610 113,610 485,175
DDD Model
TN X Post X No Children under 18 0.018 -0.027 0.045 -0.017
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000}
[0.012] [0.015] [0.003] [0.089]
R-Square 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.17
N 189,837 189,837 189,837 840,868
Mean of Dependent 0.014 0.09 0.14 0.82
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a different specifications, all of them were estimated using OLS. All DD models
include state and year fixed effects while DDD models include state, year, chidless status fixed effects, and any two
way interaction between these set of fixed effects. In each model I control for race, gender, education, age and marital
status. Standards error in parenthesis are obtained from cluster standard errors. The P-values from with cluster
standard errors are in while the p-values in [] were obtained using the standard errors from a modified block-bootstrap
procedure. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee for non-elderly adults.
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Table 5: Effects of Disenrollment on Health Care Access Using NHIS and BRFSS 2000-2010
Mean of Full Sample Sample: SampleDependent HS Degree or less More than HS Degree
Panel A: Using NHIS
Medicaid 0.09 -0.027 -0.048 -0.015
(0.003) (0.014) (0.007)
{0.000} {0.002} {0.039}
[0.015] [0.014] [0.154]
Losing Medicaid 0.014 0.018 0.036 0.002
(0.003) (0.008) (0.005)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.692}
[0.012] [0.012] [0.687]
Uninsured 0.14 0.045 0.052 0.040
(0.003) (0.024) (0.018)
{0.000} {0.036} {0.031}
[0.003] [0.060] [0.014]
Panel B: Using BRFSS
Insured 0.82 -0.017 -0.026 -0.011
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.003}
[0.089] [0.170] [0.308]
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS.
All models include, state, year, chidless status fixed effects, and any two way interaction between these set of
fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age, and marital status. Clustered Standards
error in parenthesis and associated p-values are in . The block-bootstrapped p-values are in [ ] The mean of the
dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean for childless adults.
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Table 6: Effects of Disenrollment on Health Care Access Using NHIS and BRFSS 2000-2010
Mean of Full Sample Sample: SampleDependent HS Degree or less More than HS Degree
Panel A: Using NHIS
Pr(Forgone or Delay Care due to Cost in past 12 months) 0.11 0.032 0.042 0.023
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.001}
[0.004] [0.035] [0.106]
Pr(Cannot Afford Prescription Drugs) 0.11 0.019 0.044 -0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.845}
[0.290] [0.205] [0.966]
Pr(Seen/talk to a general doctor in past 12 months) 0.59 -0.024 -0.042 -0.003
(0.007) (0.017) (0.008)
{0.003} {0.025} {0.712}
[0.442] [0.393] [0.934]
Panel B: Using BRFSS
Pr(Forgone Care due to Cost in past 12 months) 0.12 0.013 0.038 -0.007
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.014}
[0.259] [0.055] [0.582]
Pr(Had a Dr Check-up in the past 12 months) 0.76 -0.022 -0.039 -0.013
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.010}
[0.246] [0.157] [0.585]
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include, state, year, chidless
status fixed effects, and any two way interaction between these set of fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age, and marital
status. Clustered Standards error in parenthesis and associated p-values are in . The block-bootstrapped p-values are in [ ]. The mean of the dependent
is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean for childless adults.
67
Table 7: Effects of Disenrollment on Preventive Care Using BRFSS 2000-2010
Mean of Full Sample Sample SampleDependent HS Degree or Less More than a HS Degree
Panel A: General Population
Had a Flu shot in the past 12 months? 0.32 0.027 0.024 0.028
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.000}
[0.025] [0.152] [0.091]
Had Cholesterol Check in the past 12 months? 0.61 -0.021 -0.012 -0.033
(0.004) (0.012) (0.005)
{0.074} {0.487} {0.007}
[0.219] [0.643] [0.113]
Panel B: For Women
Had a Mammogram in the past 12 months? 0.70 -0.007 0.011 -0.030
(Over 50) (0.031) (0.039) (0.040)
{0.369} {0.409} {0.464}
[0.831] [0.791] [0.474]
Had a Breat Exam in the past 12 months? 0.75 -0.008 0.009 -0.023
(Over 21) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
{0.195} {0.174} {0.043}
[0.644] [0.726] [0.307]
Had a Pap Exam in the past 12 months? 0.72 0.002 -0.003 0.004
(Over 21) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
{0.706} {0.704} {0.419}
[0.903] [0.907] [0.852]
Panel C: For Men over 40
Had a PSA Exam in the past 12 months? 0.43 -0.003 -0.063 0.041
(0.009) (0.021) (0.007)
{0.771} {0.008} {0.000}
[0.945] [0.250] [0.430]
Had a Rectal Exam in the past 12 months? 0.39 0.001 -0.017 0.012
(0.0045) (0.011) (0.008)
{0.836} {0.147} {0.169}
[0.977] [0.758] [0.829]
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include, State, Year,
Childless status Fixed Effects, and any two way interaction between these set of fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education,
age and marital status. Standards error in parenthesis and P-values are in brackets both obtained from a modified block-bootstrap procedure.
The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean for childless adults.
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Table 8: Effects of Disenrollment on Health Behaviors Using BRFSS 2000-2010
Mean of Full Sample Sample: Sample:Dependent HS Degree or Less More than HS Degree
Panel A: Summary Measure for Health Behaviors
Index “Taking Better Care -0.04 0.011 0.091 -0.049
(0.022) (0.040) (0.025)
[0.608] [0.022] [0.044]
Panel B: BMI and Non-risky Health Behaviors
Participates in Physical Activity 0.73 0.004 0.012 0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
{0.248} {0.086} {0.623}
[0.742] [0.539] [0.918]
Daily Servings of Fruits and Vegetables 3.63 -0.095 0.0140 -0.178
(0.019) (0.029) (0.038)
{0.000} {0.633} {0.000}
[0.210] [0.906] [0.101]
Panel C: Risky Health Behaviors
Bing Drinking 0.12 -0.002 -0.021 0.017
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
{0.448} {0.000} {0.000}
[0.849] [0.217] [0.190]
Any Drink in Past 30 Days 0.47 -0.015 -0.026 -0.006
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
{0.010} {0.002} {0.261}
[0.324] [0.219] [0.769]
Drinks per Occassion in the Past 30 Days 1.08 -0.074 -0.222 0.068
(0.020) (0.037) (0.016)
{0.002} {0.000} {0.001}
[0.421] [0.132] [0.276]
Currently a Smoker 0.27 0.006 -0.001 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
{0.004} {0.679} {0.019}
[0.587] [0.942] [0.589]
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include, State, Year,
Childless status Fixed Effects, and any two way interaction between these set of fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender,
education, age and marital status. Standards error in parenthesis and P-values are in brackets both obtained from a modified block-bootstrap
procedure. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean for childless adults.
69
Table 9: Effects of Disenrollment on Self-Assesed Health Using NHIS and BRFSS 2000-2010
Mean of Full Sample Sample: SampleDependent HS Degree or less More than HS Degree
Panel A: Using NHIS
Pr(Reporting Excellent Health) 0.30 0.026 0.021 0.030
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
{0.000} {0.001} {0.001}
[0.135] [0.327] [0.243]
Pr(Reporting Fair or Poor Health) 0.12 -0.014 -0.038 0.0003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
{0.000} {0.001} {0.981}
[0.296] [0.093] [0.982]
Panel B: Using BRFSS
Pr(Reporting Excellent Health) 0.20 -0.005 0.002 -0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
{0.023} {0.360} {0.007}
[0.628] [0.882] [0.595]
Pr(Reporting Fair or Poor Health) 0.20 0.009 0.016 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
{0.005} {0.005} {0.638}
[0.273] [0.354] [0.877]
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include,
state, year, chidless status fixed effects, and any two way interaction between these set of fixed effects. In this model I control
for race, gender, education, age and marital status. Standards error in parenthesis and P-values are in brackets both obtained
from a modified blockbootstrap procedure. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean for childless
adults.
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Table 10: Effects of Disenrollment on Having Bed Days Using NHIS 2000-2010
Mean of Full Sample Sample: SampleDependent HS Degree or less More than HS Degree
Panel A: Using NHIS
Number of Bed Days in past 12 months 5.1 0.666 1.592 0.875
(0.330) (0.619) (0.328)
{0.060} {0.020} {0.012}
[0.723] [0.574] [0.724]
Panel B: Using BRFSS
Number of Days with Bad Physical Health 3.9 -0.067 0.294 -0.413
(0.049) (0.102) (0.064)
{0.190} {0.011} {0.000}
[0.749] [0.429] [0.092]
Number of Days with Bad Mental Health 3.3 0.132 0.229 0.026
(0.055) (0.069) (0.092)
{0.028} {0.004} {0.786}
[0.554] [0.575] [0.914]
Number of Days of Incapacitation 4.7 0.836 1.213 0.437
(0.064) (0.114) (0.064)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.000}
[0.018] [0.027] [0.260]
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include, state,
year, chidless status fixed effects, and any two way interaction between these set of fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender,
education, age and marital status. Standards error in parenthesis and P-values are in brackets both obtained from a modified block
bootstrap procedure. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment mean in Tennessee for childless adults.
71
Table 11: Effects of Disenrollment on Place to go for Medical Care when Sick NHIS 2000-2010
Mean of Full Sample Sample: Sample
Dependent HS Degree or less More than HS Degree
Panel A: Place of Usual Care when sick
Pr(Change health care place due to health insurance) 0.03 0.019 0.039 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.514}
[0.075] [0.019] [0.916]
Pr(Has usual place of care) 0.81 0.033 0.039 0.033
(0.006) (0.012) (0.004)
{0.034} {0.005} {0.000}
[0.149] [0.291] [0.218]
Panel B: Type of Usual Place Care when sick
Pr(Usual place is Clinic) 0.12 0.022 0.021 0.025
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
{0.049} {0.001} {0.000}
[0.270] [0.512] [0.301]
Pr(Usual place is Dr or HMO) 0.65 0.009 -0.015 0.033
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
{0.216} {0.265} {0.000}
[0.748] [0.738] [0.366]
Pr(Usual place is ED) 0.01 0.004 0.021 -0.009
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
{0.001} {0.000} {0.000}
[0.568] [0.159] [0.168]
Pr(Usual place is Hospital Outpatient Department) 0.01 0.002 0.006 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
{0.062} {0.000} {0.624}
[0.508] [0.309] [0.834]
Pr(Does not have a usual place of care) 0.19 -0.032 -0.037 -0.033
(0.006) (0.013) (0.005)
{0.000} {0.012} {0.000}
[0.152] [0.355] [0.233]
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include, state, year, chidless
status fixed effects, and any two way interaction between these set of fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age and
marital status. Standards error in parenthesis and P-values are in brackets both obtained from a modified block bootstrap procedure. The mean of
the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean for childless adults.
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Table 12: Effects of Disenrollment on Hospital Health Care Using NHIS 2000-2010
Mean of Full Sample Sample: SampleDependent HS Degree or less More than HS Degree
Pr(Going to the ED in the past 12 months) 0.22 -0.0003 0.015 -0.021
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
{0.941} {0.048} {0.000}
[0.988] [0.732] [0.461]
Number of times in ED in the past 12 months 0.33 -0.008 0.026 -0.048
(0.007) (0.019) (0.011)
{0.269} {0.190} {0.000}
[0.881] [0.748] [0.448]
Pr(Had surgery in the past 12 months) 0.12 -0.028 -0.062 -0.006
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.509}
[0.274] [0.044] [0.816]
Number of surgeries in the past 12 months 0.15 -0.034 -0.109 0.028
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
{0.001} {0.000} {0.033}
[0.288] [0.051] [0.482]
Pr(Had any overnight hospital stay in the past 12 months) 0.08 0.008 0.003 0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
{0.017} {0.464} {0.004}
[0.474] [0.845] [0.474]
Number of times being an inpatient in the past 12 months 0.13 -0.013 -0.058 0.009
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
{0.019} {0.000} {0.217}
[0.603] [0.337] [0.701]
Average number of nights per stayed if Overnight 3.55 -0.194 1.982 -2.841
(0.413) (0.653) (0.186)
{0.645} {0.008} {0.000}
[0.883] [0.244] [0.206]
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include, state, year, chidless status
fixed effects, and any two way interaction between these set of fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age and marital status.
Standards error in parenthesis and P-values are in brackets both obtained from a modified block bootstrap procedure. The mean of the dependent is the
pre-treatment in Tennessee mean for childless adults.
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Table 13: Effects of the Reform on Payment Types Using NIS 2000 -
2010
Medicaid Self-Pay Private Medicare
TN X Post -0.039 0.018 0.0280 -0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000}
N 31,55,042 31,55,042 31,55,042 31,550,42
R-Squared 0.0612 0.0589 0.124 0.0337
Pre Mean in TN 0.27 0.11 0.43 0.21
Notes: Using 100 percent of Data. State, Year-Quarter, Hospital and Month
FE Using Years 2000 thru 2010
Table 14: Effects of the Reform on Number of Discharges Using NIS 2000 - 2010
Number of Discharges Number of Discharges Number of Discharges Number of Discharges
Total Non-Elderly Adults Elderly Under 18
TN X Post -85.71 -78.42 -12.21 4.865
(0.033) (0.014) (0.026) (0.009)
{0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000}
N 17,134 17,134 17,134 17,134
R-Squared 0.988 0.980 0.987 0.978
Pre Mean in TN 397.2 184.1 136.9 76.12
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a DD specifications for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include state, year-
quarter, state-year, and hospital fixed effects. I use 20 percent of the discharges per hospital. Standards error in parenthesis and P-values
are in brackets both obtained from a modified block bootstrap procedure. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table A.1: Summary Statistics of Demographic Variables 2000-2010 BRFSS Data
TN Southern States TN Southern States Total
Before Before After After
Black 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16
Hispanic 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.14 0.13
Other Races 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06
Female 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
Kinder or never attended school 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Grades 1 through 8 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03
Grades 9 through 11 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
Grade 12 or GED 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.27 0.29
College 1 year to 3 year 0.29 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.27
Reported Age in years 41.45 40.92 42.98 42.12 41.54
Divorced 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.11
Widowed 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Separated 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Never Married 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.16
Unmarried Couple 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03
Less than 10K 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Less than 15K 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Less than 20K 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08
Less than 25K 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.09
Less than 35K 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.13
Less than 50K 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.17
Less than 75K 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17
75K or more 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.34 0.27
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 2000-2010 NHIS Data
TN Southern States TN Southern States Total
Before Before After After
Female 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51
Age 41.28 41.10 41.63 41.81 41.43
Less than HS 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.15
HS or GED 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.29
Some College 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.29
White 0.82 0.66 0.75 0.62 0.65
Black 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19
Hispanic 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.13
Asian 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
American Indian, Alaska Native 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Other race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Multiple Race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Married 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.60 0.62
Divorced 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Widowed 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10
Separated 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
Never Married 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17
Unmarried Couple 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
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Table A.3: Effects Disenrollment on Health Insurance Coverage Using BRFSS and NHIS 2000-2010
Uninsured Medicaid Private Medicare Lost Medicaid Health Coverage
DD Model, All Adults NHIS NHIS NHIS NHIS NHIS BRFSS
TN X Post 0.043 -0.028 -0.006 -0.004 0.011 -0.031
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.536] [0.326] [0.012] [0.000]
R-Square 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.05 0.03 0.16
N 193086 193086 193086 193086 142192 572769
DD model, sample with children< 18
TN X Post 0.013 -0.009 0.014 -0.001 0.005 -0.026
(0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009)
[0.291] [0.332] [0.345] [0.790] [0.464] [0.005]
R-Square 0.18 0.11 0.23 0.02 0.06 0.18
N 76227 76227 76227 76227 57249 250077
DD model, sample without children< 18
TN X Post 0.052 -0.030 -0.020 -0.007 0.014 -0.036
(0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.118] [0.225] [0.001] [0.000]
R-Square 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.13
N 113610 113610 113610 113610 82614 322151
DDD Model
TN X Post X No Children under 18 0.045 -0.027 -0.032 -0.011 0.018 -0.017
(0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
[0.003] [0.015] [0.068] [0.103] [0.012] [0.089]
R-Square 0.16 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.04 0.16
N 189837 189837 189837 189837 137962 572228
Mean of Dependent 0.14 0.09 0.71 0.04 0.014 0.82
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models
include state, year, chidless status fixed effects , and any two way interaction between these set of fixed effects. In
this model I control for race, gender, education, age and marital status. Modified block-bootStrap standards error in
parenthesis and p-values are in brackets.The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean for childless
adults.
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Table A.4: Effects of Disenrollment on Health Care Access Using NHIS 2000-2010
Mean of Full Sample Sample: SampleDependent HS Degree or less More than HS Degree
Panel A: Using NHIS
Uninsured 0.14 0.045 0.052 0.040
(0.012) (0.026) (0.015)
[0.003] [0.060] [0.014]
Medicaid 0.09 -0.027 -0.048 -0.015
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010)
[0.015 [0.014] [0.154]
Private 0.71 -0.032 -0.009 -0.049
(0.016) (0.028) (0.020)
[0.068] [0.741] [0.027]
Medicare 0.04 -0.011 -0.016 -0.005
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007)
[0.103] [0.161] [0.455]
Notes: Each coefficient comes from the DDD specification for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All
models include state, year, chidless status fixed effects, and any two way interaction between these set of fixed
effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age and marital status. Modified block-bootStrap
standards error in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in
Tennessee
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Table 5: Effects Disenrollment on Medicaid Coverage Using NHIS 2000-2010 - DD
Sample: Full Sample Sample: HS Degree or Less Sample: More than HS Degree
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
with Chilren with Chilren with Chilren
TN X Post -0.028 -0.030 -0.009 -0.044 -0.048 -0.011 -0.012 -0.015 0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.332] [0.000] [0.001] [0.550] [0.029] [0.030] [0.980]
R-Squared 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.07
N 193086 113610 76227 92673 54292 36072 100413 59318 40155
Mean of Dependent 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.03
Pre Mean in TN 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Notes: The sample includes individuals who live in southern states as defined by the U.S Census of ages 21 to 64 Each coefficient comes from the DD specification
for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include state and year fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age and marital
status. Modified block-bootStrap standards error in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean.
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Table 6: Effects Disenrollment on Uninsurance Rate Using NHIS 2000-2010 - DD
Sample: Full Sample Sample: HS Degree or Less Sample: More than HS Degree
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
with Chilren with Chilren with Chilren
TN X Post 0.043 0.052 0.013 0.061 0.068 0.021 0.024 0.036 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.291] [0.000] [0.000] [0.309] [0.026] [0.008] [0.891]
R-Squared 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.09
N 193086 113610 76227 92673 54292 36072 100413 59318 40155
Mean of Dependent 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.16 0.16 0.14
Pre Mean in TN 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Notes: The sample includes individuals who live in southern states as defined by the U.S Census of ages 21 to 64 Each coefficient comes from the DD specification
for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include state and year fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age and marital
status. Modified block-bootStrap standards error in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean.
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Table 7: Effects Disenrollment on Private Coverage Rate Using NHIS 2000-2010 - DD
Sample: Full Sample Sample: HS Degree or Less Sample: More than HS Degree
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
with Chilren with Chilren with Chilren
TN X Post -0.006 -0.020 0.014 0.016 0.006 0.026 -0.026 -0.044 0.001
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015)
[0.536] [0.118] [0.345] [0.290] [0.724] [0.298] [0.047] [0.007] [0.925]
R-Squared 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.12
N 193086 113610 76227 92673 54292 36072 100413 59318 40155
Mean of Dependent 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.78 0.77 0.79
Pre Mean in TN 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Notes: The sample includes individuals who live in southern states as defined by the U.S Census of ages 21 to 64 Each coefficient comes from the DD specification
for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include state and year fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age and marital
status. Modified block-bootStrap standards error in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean.
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Table 8: Effects Disenrollment on Reporting Losing Medicaid Using NHIS 2000-2010 - DD
Sample: Full Sample Sample: HS Degree or Less Sample: More than HS Degree
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
with Chilren with Chilren with Chilren
TN X Post 0.011 0.014 0.005 0.024 0.030 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.004 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.014 0.003 0.003 0.006
0.012 0.001 0.464 0.002 0.000 0.579 0.809 0.733 0.831
R-Squared 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.04
N 193086 113610 76227 92673 54292 36072 100413 59318 40155
Mean of Dependent 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02
Pre Mean in TN 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Notes: The sample includes individuals who live in southern states as defined by the U.S Census of ages 21 to 64 Each coefficient comes from the DD specification
for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include state and year fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age and marital
status. Modified block-bootStrap standards error in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean.
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Table 9: Effects Disenrollment on Medicare Rates Using NHIS 2000-2010 - DD
Sample: Full Sample Sample: HS Degree or Less Sample: More than HS Degree
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
Baseline Childless Adults
Adults
with Chilren with Chilren with Chilren
TN X Post -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.013 -0.016 -0.009 0.002 0.000 0.005
0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.005
0.326 0.225 0.790 0.088 0.106 0.147 0.631 0.991 0.335
R-Squared 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01
N 193086 113610 76227 92673 54292 36072 100413 59318 40155
Mean of Dependent 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01
Pre Mean in TN 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Notes: The sample includes individuals who live in southern states as defined by the U.S Census of ages 21 to 64 Each coefficient comes from the DD specification
for different sub-samples estimated using OLS. All models include state and year fixed effects. In this model I control for race, gender, education, age and marital
status. Modified block-bootStrap standards error in parenthesis and p-values are in brackets. The mean of the dependent is the pre-treatment in Tennessee mean.
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CHAPTER 2 
DO ‘CHEESEBURGER BILLS’ WORK? EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM 
FOR FAST FOOD 
With Christopher S. Carpenter 
1. Introduction 
In 2002 McDonald’s corporation was the subject of two high profile lawsuits alleging 
liability for weight-related health claims.  In the first, Caesar Barber, a severely obese 
56 year old man from the Bronx, accused McDonald’s and other popular fast food 
chains of intentionally withholding nutritional content information from customers, 
causing him to consume unhealthy food without his knowledge.1  In the second, the 
parents of Ashley Pelman and Jazlen Bradley – two severely obese teenagers – sued 
McDonald’s on the basis of deceptive marketing.  Although both of these cases were 
ultimately dismissed, McDonald’s and other fast food restaurants viewed the threat of 
lawsuits as non-trivial.  Around this same time period, McDonald’s eliminated its 
‘super-size’ option, provided nutrition information on food packaging, and added 
healthier options such as salads and fruit to its menu, and other restaurants took similar 
actions.2 
 Regardless of the legal merits of claims such as those in the Barber and Pelman 
cases, there is strong popular belief that holding food companies legally responsible 
                                                     
1 Barber also sued Burger King, Wendy’s, and Kentucky Fried Chicken. 
2 McDonald’s is no stranger to high profile lawsuits and has paid out very large jury awards and 
settlements in the 1994 hot coffee case, the 2005 acrylamide case, and others.  More recently, in 2010 
the Center for Science in the Public Interest sued McDonald’s, alleging that toys in Happy Meals 
constituted deceptive marketing to children. 
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for obesity-related claims is unwarranted at best and ridiculous at worst.  In response 
to the potentially costly effects of these and similar lawsuits, states quickly began to 
adopt laws that explicitly limited liability of food companies in weight-based claims.  
Termed ‘Commonsense Consumption Acts’ (henceforth CCAs) but more commonly 
known as ‘Cheeseburger Bills’, these laws were promoted by the National Restaurant 
Association and achieved a great deal of success beginning as early as 2003.  In June 
of that year, Louisiana became the first state to adopt a CCA; by the end of 2004, 12 
other states had followed suit.  Today, 26 states have adopted some limit on legal 
liability for the food industry.  A federal version titled ‘American Personal 
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act’ was introduced to Congress by Florida 
Republican and self-acknowledged fast-food lover Ric Keller in both 2004 (HR339) 
and 2005 (HR554).  Both times it passed in the House but did not pass the Senate. 
 Commonsense Consumption Acts effectively serve as tort reform for the food 
industry (in particular, the fast-food industry, which is the subject of most of the legal 
attention).  These laws share several common features, and in fact many share a nearly 
identical structure and language (see Appendix A for an example).   Specifically, the 
modal CCA protects food manufacturers, packers, distributors, carriers, holders, 
sellers, marketers, and advertisers from civil actions for claims arising out of weight 
gain, obesity, health conditions associated with weight gain or obesity, or other known 
conditions likely to result from long-term consumption of food.  CCAs also generally 
clarify the conditions under which protection is not extended: if there is a violation of 
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the adulteration or misbranding requirement or if there is any other knowing and 
willful material violation of state or federal laws pertaining to manufacture, sale, 
distribution, marketing, or labeling of food.  Most laws explicitly define ‘food’ using 
the Food and Drug Administration definition that includes beverages.  Some CCAs 
also contain explicit exceptions for altered products, deceptively advertised products, 
or fraudulent claims.  Thus, proponents of CCAs claim that they still provide adequate 
protection to consumers while at the same time limiting frivolous lawsuits. 
 Opponents of CCAs (including the Center for Science in the Public Interest) 
claim that the laws are simply designed to help the large and powerful food industry – 
particularly fast food and the National Restaurant Association, which was the primary 
supporter and financial sponsor of state and federal CCA lobbying activity – make 
more money and avoid their responsibilities to society.  Opponents also claim that the 
fact there have been no successful obesity-related lawsuits suggests that, in fact, the 
legal system in this realm is not broken – and thus there is no need to fix it.3 
 Indeed, the success of any such weight-based claim hinges critically on a link 
that many legal experts agree is the fundamental problem with such cases: establishing 
                                                     
3 There are examples of successful obesity-related lawsuits against McDonald’s in other countries.  For 
example, in a 2010 case in Brazil, McDonald’s was ordered to pay $17,500 to one of its managers who 
alleged the company contributed to his 65 pound weight gain over 12 years in part by supplying him 
free meals.  The manager also claimed that ‘mystery shoppers’ sent by the firm to the store required 
him to eat the food to make sure it passed quality standards (Hartenstein 2010).  Legal scholars have 
also identified other possible social benefits of nontrivial obesity-related legal threats to fast food 
companies.  For example, such threats may increase consumer awareness of obesity and nutrition issues, 
and it also may incentivize fast food companies to voluntarily change menus or alter their marketing 
practices (Mello et al. 2003). 
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a causal connection between consumption at a particular restaurant (e.g., McDonald’s) 
and weight-related harms.  Despite this inherent legal challenge, two trends suggest 
that legal action against fast food companies is unlikely to go away.  First, there has 
been a well-documented and high-profile dramatic rise in population rates of obesity.  
Second, there has been a concomitant reduction in the relative price of calories 
consumed away from home, particularly at fast food restaurants.  These factors give 
many observers reason to believe that from a legal standpoint obesity could become 
the next tobacco: that is, just as the largest US tobacco companies were on the losing 
end of class-action lawsuits and huge jury awards for smoking-related illnesses two 
decades ago, experts have suggested that we might see similar obesity-related legal 
activity for economic and non-economic damages pertaining to weight-based health 
problems.4 
 Documenting the effects of Commonsense Consumption Acts is important 
for several reasons.  First, our results help inform a large and growing literature in law 
and economics on the effects of other more traditionally studied tort reforms.  
                                                     
4 In the debates over obesity litigation, many parallels are made with tobacco litigation.  In both cases 
the products in question are harmful to public health if consumed in excess quantity and are potentially 
addictive, and in both cases there are claims that companies may have deceived consumers about the 
content, safety, and addictiveness of the products.  Moreover, in both cases the public thought it was 
implausible that plaintiffs would win large jury awards.  The release of tobacco industry documents 
through the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement – which was negotiated after several state Attorneys 
General filed class action lawsuits against the largest tobacco companies in the United States (RJ 
Reynolds and Lorillard) – helped fuel big awards.  Notably, Altria Group (formerly Phillip Morris), one 
of the largest tobacco companies worldwide, actively lobbied for adoption of the federal cheeseburger 
bill.  As of 2014, lawyers in at least 16 states have lobbied state Attorneys General to require the food 
industry to pay for obesity-related health care costs (Evich 2014). 
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Specifically, our study provides direct evidence on whether parties take more care 
when they are less able to sue companies for the harmful effects of products.  This is 
a central idea behind tort reform and has been studied extensively in the context of 
medical malpractice.  For example, multiple studies have found that tort reforms such 
as caps on economic damages and establishment of joint and several liability rules are 
associated with significant changes in the way doctors practice medicine and in health 
outcomes (e.g. mortality and birth outcomes) (Currie and McLeod 2008).  Second, our 
study provides direct evidence on whether the laws are having their intended effects, 
as one explicit goal of CCAs was to induce people to take more personal responsibility 
for their food consumption and weight.  Debate over these regulations remains at the 
top of the legislative agenda in many states: North Carolina’s CCA went into effect in 
October 2013, while Governor Mark Dayton of Minnesota vetoed his state’s CCA in 
May 2011.  There is substantial latitude for the remaining states to adopt their own 
CCAs or for a federal version of a CCA to be reintroduced. 
 In this paper we provide the first empirical evidence on the effects of CCAs 
on investments in weight-related health, population weight, fast-food prices, and fast-
food market size.  We use several datasets and a two-way fixed effects empirical 
framework that identifies the effects of CCAs on outcomes using quasi-random 
variation in the timing of policy adoption across states, net of area (city or state) and 
year fixed effects, linear area-specific time trends, state unemployment rates and other 
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state characteristics, and other state policies related to tort-reform (e.g., damage caps) 
and obesity prevention (e.g., menu labelling laws). 
To preview, we find that CCAs significantly increased the likelihood that 
individuals state they are currently trying to lose weight.  We also find that CCAs 
significantly increased healthy food consumption as measured by the number of 
servings of fruits and vegetables consumed per day.  In both cases, we find that these 
effects are concentrated among heavy individuals.  We do not find any effects of CCAs 
on exercise, nor do we find that the CCA-induced changes in weight loss attempts and 
healthy food consumption translated into contemporaneous changes in body weight.  
These null weight effects are precise: our large samples of individual data allow us to 
rule out effects of CCAs on population weight larger than 0.2 percent.  We find no 
consistent effects of CCAs on prices of fast food or other food items.  Regarding the 
fast-food market, we find some evidence that CCAs increased employment in fast 
food restaurants within the state.  Finally, we show that CCAs significantly increased 
the number of company-owned McDonald’s restaurants and reduced the number of 
franchise-owned McDonald’s restaurants in a state.  Our results are important because 
they provide novel evidence supporting a key tenet of tort reform – that it should 
induce parties to take more care – and demonstrate that industry-specific tort reform 
can affect market-wide outcomes. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the mechanisms through 
which CCAs could plausibly have affected health and market outcomes and provides 
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a brief literature review.  Section 3 describes the data and outlines the empirical 
approach.  Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 discusses and concludes. 
 
2. Mechanisms and Literature Review 
2.1 Mechanisms 
How might Commonsense Consumption Acts affect individual and market outcomes 
in fast food?  There are several possible mechanisms.  First, for health outcomes, there 
is a straightforward moral hazard explanation.  This mechanism predicts that because 
CCAs eliminate the ‘insurance’ function of litigation, heavy individuals should be more 
likely to invest in weight-related health.  That is, individuals in states without CCAs (or 
prior to CCA adoption) could reason that if they became sick due to their food 
consumption, they could plausibly have legal recourse to recover health costs and 
personal damages by suing food manufacturers.  CCAs make this avenue substantially 
less attractive by providing those manufacturers some degree of immunity from 
weight-based claims, and as such the laws should be expected to induce shifts toward 
healthier consumption and weight loss attempts.5   
A challenge with the pure moral hazard mechanism is that it requires 
individuals to credibly believe that they might successfully sue fast-food companies for 
their weight-related health costs in the absence of CCAs and to be aware of CCA 
                                                     
5 These effects should be concentrated among heavy individuals, as they are the most likely to suffer 
weight-related harms.  People who are underweight may also experience increased risk for some health 
problems, but in those cases it is more difficult to imagine them suing food manufacturers in an attempt 
to recover health costs and noneconomic damages. 
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adoption in their state substantially eroding this possibility.  While major national 
newspapers and television programs covered debates over the federal Cheeseburger 
bill and some of the state laws, it is difficult to know who saw and read those news 
stories.  Google Trends data confirm that there was a spike in national searches for 
the phrase ‘Cheeseburger Bill’ in late 2005 when the federal law passed the House, as 
well as in 2011 (when Minnesota adopted a CCA before its governor vetoed it) and in 
late 2013 (when North Carolina adopted a CCA) (shown in Figure 1).  Unfortunately, 
Google Trends does not provide comparable data for individual states due to 
insufficiently low search volume for the specific term.6  We note that even if people 
did not know about CCAs in their state from local newspaper and television reports – 
which would be a problem for the moral hazard story – it could be that trial lawyers 
seek out clients for weight-based claims, thereby disseminating relevant information.7 
Another mechanism for any health effects is information.  Specifically, the 
debates about CCA could cause individuals (particularly heavy individuals) to learn or 
be reminded about society’s views and expectations regarding personal responsibility 
and weight.  Even if individuals had no intentions of ever suing fast-food companies, 
this information channel could have changed people’s behavior. 
                                                     
6 Using Google Trends to provide complementary evidence for the results on weight loss intentions 
and healthy food consumption is complicated by two further challenges. First, Google Trends does not 
have any data before 2004; given that most states adopted in 2004, we cannot implement the quasi-
experimental approach used in the main analyses.  Second, it is not clear what the right search terms 
would be for each of the health outcomes for which we find significant associations.  For example, for 
weight loss intentions one could imagine numerous possible search terms such as ‘lose weight’, ‘diet’, 
‘diet foods’, and others. 
7 Both the Barber and the Pelman cases were brought by the same lawyer (Samuel Hirsch). 
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Regarding market size, CCAs should be expected to increase entry into and 
reduce exit from the fast food industry (thus increasing the overall fast-food market 
size) by lowering costs of operation, especially litigation costs and liability insurance 
costs, which prior work has shown is responsive to tort reform (Born et al. 2009, 
Viscusi and Born 2005).  Prices should be plausibly affected by simple supply and 
demand forces: if CCAs reduce demand for fast food due to either of the channels 
described above for individual health outcomes and if CCAs weakly increase supply 
of fast food restaurants, then prices of fast food should decline.8 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Regarding prior literature related to CCAs, we are not aware of any studies in 
economics that evaluate their effects.  Despite this gap in the literature, scholars in 
health policy and law have studied the public health and legal issues related to obesity 
litigation in general (Mello et al. 2003, Courtney 2006) and CCAs in particular (Jones 
2005, Wilking and Daynard 2013).  And despite the lack of specific economics 
evaluations of CCAs, there is a substantial literature in empirical health economics that 
studies the causes of the obesity epidemic (see, for example, Courtemanche et al. 
2014), including studies that specifically focus on the role of restaurants (e.g., Currie 
et al. 2010, Chou et al. 2004). 
                                                     
8 A relevant issue is the degree of latitude franchisees have at setting prices.  Our price data suggest 
there is substantial latitude for individual restaurants to set prices, as there is a great deal of variation 
across locations, even within the same quarter.  This basic finding is confirmed in recent work using a 
panel of McDonald’s prices in the Bay Area (Ater and Rigbi 2007). 
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Our work is also related to a well-developed literature in law and economics 
on the effects of policies such as caps on non-economic damages, caps on punitive 
damages, joint and several liability rules, collateral source rules, and others on 
outcomes such as insurance premiums (e.g. Viscusi et al 1993, Born et al 1998, Born 
et al. 2009, Avraham et al. 2012), defensive medicine (Kessler and McClellan 1996, 
Sloan and Shadle 2009), and health outcomes such as mortality and birth outcomes 
(Currie and McLeod 2008).  More recent work has suggested that movements toward 
national standards of care are also important in this context (Frakes 2014). 
 
3. Data Description and Empirical Approach 
3.1 Data Description 
We use multiple datasets to test for effects of CCAs on outcomes.  Our primary 
outcome data for adult weight-related outcomes come from public use versions of the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).  These telephone surveys are 
fielded every year by state health departments and are coordinated by the Centers for 
Disease Control who compiles them into an annual individual level dataset that is 
designed to be representative at the state level.  As most of the laws we study were 
adopted in the mid-2000s, our primary analysis sample is 2000-2012. 
Individuals in the BRFSS are asked to state their height and weight (weight 
without shoes on).9  We use these responses to create body mass index (BMI) which 
                                                     
9 We used adjustments for self-reported height and weight based on gender, race and age (Cawley 2004, 
Cawley and Burkhauser 2008, Courtemanche et al. 2014). 
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equals weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared.  In addition to height 
and weight, individuals are also asked about several other weight-related outcomes and 
behaviors.  We examine BRFSS outcomes related to exercise and healthy food 
consumption as two possibilities.  Regarding exercise, the BRFSS asks respondents: 
“During the past month, other than your regular job, did you participate in any physical 
activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening, or walking for 
exercise?”  We create a variable called ANY EXERCISE that equals one if the person 
reported any past month exercise.  Regarding healthy food consumption, the BRFSS 
asks respondents in several years (2000-2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2012) about 
the number of servings of fruits and vegetables the individual reports eating on a usual 
day.10  We create a variable called TOTAL FRUITS AND VEGETABLES 
SERVINGS PER DAY that represents the number of total servings of fruits and 
vegetables the respondent reports eating per day.  Finally, for a limited set of years 
(2000-2003, and 2005) and states we also observe responses to a question about weight 
intentions.  Specifically, individuals are asked: “Are you now trying to lose weight?”.  
We therefore examine an indicator variable for TRYING TO LOSE WEIGHT. 
                                                     
10 Specifically, from 2000-2009 the BRFSS asks: “These next questions are about the foods you usually 
eat or drink.  Please tell me how often you eat or drink each one. … Include all foods you eat, both at 
home and away from home.”  Respondents can report numbers of servings consumed per day, per 
week, per month, or per year; we convert all responses into average number of servings consumed per 
day.  The specific foods asked include: fruit juices such as orange, grapefruit, or tomato; fruit not 
counting juice; green salad; potatoes not including French fries, fried potatoes, or potato chips; carrots; 
and vegetables not counting carrots, potatoes, or salad.  For the years 2011 and 2012 the vegetables 
questions ask about beans, green vegetables, orange vegetables and other types of vegetables.  
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We also examine fast food prices using data from the ACCRA/C2ER 
database.  ACCRA data were originally designed to provide cost of living estimates for 
urban professionals and have been collected quarterly since 1976.  Typically volunteers 
from local Chambers of Commerce would collect information on prices of several 
local goods in multiple locations, and ACCRA/C2ER compiled these into a city-
specific index.  These data have been used extensively in the existing literature on 
obesity in part because of the large number of participating cities.  From 2000-2012 
we observe three relevant fast-food prices: a McDonald’s Quarter Pounder with 
Cheese; an 11”-12” Pizza Hut or Pizza Inn thin crust cheese pizza; and a thigh and 
drumstick from either Kentucky Fried Chicken or Church’s Chicken.  We also observe 
prices of other food items which serve as placebo or falsification outcomes: a half 
gallon of whole milk, a loaf of bread, a ten pound sack of potatoes, and an overall 
grocery price index.11  We measure all prices in real 2010 US dollars. 
We use data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) 
to study effects on market size.  These data are published by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) and contain quarterly counts of employment and wages reported by 
employers who cover 98 percent of all U.S jobs.  Importantly, these data also identify 
the relevant industry for each employer.  We use data from 2000-2012 on the number 
of establishments and wages for different industries, including limited-service 
restaurants (i.e., fast food establishments who should be most directly affected by 
                                                     
11 We note that the sampling of the ACCRA data has some limitations, most obviously that we do not 
observe prices in rural markets. 
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CCAs), full-service restaurants (generally establishments with ‘sit down’ table service 
that may also be partly affected by CCAs but which were not targeted in most of the 
lawsuits), and other industries such as gas stations with convenience stores and grocery 
stores which should have been unaffected by CCAs and therefore serve as controls or 
placebo outcomes. 
 We supplement the QCEW data with information on the number of 
McDonald’s franchises and McDonald’s company owned stores in each state and year 
from 2000-2012.  These data are reported in annual Uniform Franchising Offering 
Circulars (UFOC, later called Franchise Disclosure Documents after 2008).  These are 
legal documents that the Federal Trade Commission requires each parent company to 
provide to potential franchisees; recent years are available on various state commerce 
department websites, and we supplemented these by purchasing individual years from 
Frandata.com.  We chose McDonald’s given their involvement in the major court cases 
that led to CCA adoption. 
3.2 Empirical Approach 
To estimate the effect of the CCAs across all the datasets, we estimate standard 
difference-in-differences models that rely on plausibly exogenous variation in the 
timing of adoption of CCAs across states.  For the BRFSS-based analyses of individual 
level data we estimate the following model: 
(1) Yist = β0 + β1Xist + β2(COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT)st + β3Zst 
+ β4Ss + β5Tt + β6Ss*TREND + εist 
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where Y are the weight-related health outcomes available in the BRFSS data.  We 
estimate linear probability models on the dichotomous BRFSS outcomes for ease of 
interpretation.  Xist is a vector of individual characteristics available in the BRFSS, 
including: gender, age and its square, race/ethnicity (Hispanic, black, Asian, other), 
education (elementary, some high school, high school, some college, college or above), 
and marital status (divorced, widowed, separated, never married, member of an 
unmarried couple).  COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT is an indicator 
variable equal to one in the states and periods when a CCA is in effect which we coded 
according to Wilking and Daynard (2013) and which is reported in Table 1.12  The 
coefficient of interest is β1 and in the presence of state and year dummies (described 
below) is identified from within-state changes in outcomes coincident with variation 
in the timing of CCA adoption across states.  The key identifying assumption is that 
weight and health outcomes would have evolved identically in states with and without 
CCAs had the laws not been adopted.   
Zst is a vector of other potentially relevant state obesity-related public policies, 
some of which have been studied in prior work.  These include: soda taxes (Fletcher, 
Frisvold, and Tefft 2008), complete streets laws, state and local menu labeling laws 
                                                     
12 The coding of the CCA variable for the BRFSS outcomes takes the value of 1 if the individual’s 
interview date is on or after the law’s effective date in the state and 0 otherwise.  For the UFOC 
outcomes, the CCA variable takes the value of 1 for all years after the law is in effect and 0 otherwise, 
with the exception that for the year of adoption we set the CCA variable equal to the fraction of the 
year the law was in effect in the state.  For the ACCRA and QCEW outcomes, the CCA variable takes 
the value of 1 for all the quarters after the quarter the law was effective in the state and 0 otherwise, 
with the exception that if a law is effective in the middle of a quarter we set the CCA variable in that 
quarter equal to the fraction of the quarter the law was in effect in the state. 
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(Restrepo 2014), and cigarette taxes (Chou et al. 2004, Gruber and Frakes 2006, 
Courtemanche 2009).13  The Z vector also includes controls for more traditionally 
studied tort reforms (Avraham 2014), state unemployment rates, and state 
demographic characteristics (fraction female; fraction black, Hispanic, and other non-
white races; fraction of individuals with high school degrees and college or more, 
fraction of individuals under 21 and between 21-64; and fraction of individuals below 
the federal poverty line).14  Ss and Tt are a full set of state and year dummies, 
respectively.  We also control for state-specific linear time trends where we interact 
each state fixed effect with a variable TREND that equals 1 in 2000, 2 in 2001, and so 
forth.  In these BRFSS models we also control for (but do not show in equation 1) 
month dummies to account for seasonality in the weight-related health investments 
(e.g., exercise).  We use sample weights provided by BRFSS, and we cluster standard 
errors at the state level (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).15 
                                                     
13 Other state policies aimed at reducing obesity were also rolled out over this time period but were 
mainly focused on school environments and children as opposed to the adults we study here. 
14 State unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  State demographic 
characteristics are from the Census Bureau. 
15 In results not reported but available upon request, we estimated models that predicted the number 
of years a CCA was in effect in a state as a function of state economic and demographic characteristics, 
as well as state policies related to obesity and tort reform (but excluding state fixed effects).  We also 
controlled for the vote share to the Democratic candidate in the most recent Presidential election (to 
account for citizen ideology) and the share of the state legislature that is Democratic (since Democratic 
legislators might be friendlier to trial lawyers).  Most state demographic characteristics were not 
significantly associated with the CCA variable except the fraction of individuals aged 65 or older in a 
state and the fraction of the state below the federal poverty level which were negatively and positively 
related to the number of years a CCA was in effect in a state, respectively.  Obesity-related policies and 
tort reforms – either measured individually or as an index – were not meaningfully associated with the 
CCA variable.  State unemployment rates were generally negatively related to the number of years a 
state had a CCA in effect.  Political variables were significant predictors of CCAs, but there was a not a 
simple relationship: while the democratic share of the state legislature was negatively related to the 
number of years a CCA was in effect in a state (as expected), we also found that the vote share to the 
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For the analysis of fast food prices we account for the city-quarter nature of 
the observations and estimate the following model (estimated using OLS): 
(2) Ycst = β0 + β1 (COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT)st + β2Zst + β3Cc 
+ β4Tt + β5Cc*TREND + εcst 
where Z is as previously defined and where Ycst are the city-specific fast-food prices in 
city c in state s in quarter t.  We replace the state dummies from equation (1) with city 
dummies in equation (2), and we also replace the year fixed effects with a full set of 
fixed effects for each unique quarter in the data.  We also control for smooth linear 
city-specific time trends in equation (2) in place of the state-specific linear time trends 
in equation (1).  We continue to cluster the standard errors at the state level for the 
prices analysis, and the key identifying assumption remains: that the evolution of local 
prices in states without CCAs represents what would have occurred to prices in CCA 
states in the absence of policy adoption. 
For the QCEW data, we write the two-way fixed effects model (also estimated 
using OLS) as: 
(3) Yst = β0 + β1 (COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION ACT)st + β2Zst + β3Ss + 
β4Tt + β5Ss*TREND + εst 
where Yst are the outcomes of interest (e.g., number of establishments, number of 
employees, and average weekly wage).  All other variables are as described above in 
equation (1).  For analyses of the number of McDonald’s restaurants using UFOC data 
                                                     
democratic candidate in the most recent Presidential election was positively related to the number of 
years a CCA was in effect in a state.  Our main findings are robust to inclusion of these political variables. 
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we modify equation (3) by studying as our outcome variable the number of 
McDonald’s restaurants per state (total and separately by franchise-owned and 
company-owned).  For both the QCEW and UFOC analyses we continue to cluster 
standard errors at the state level, and we weight these regressions by annual state 
population counts.16 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Weight-Related Health Investments 
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics for the weight-related health investments 
and individual demographics in the BRFSS data.  Table 2 presents means of key 
variables relating to CCA prevalence, weight-related outcomes, and demographic 
characteristics from the BRFSS 2000-2012 sample.  We report descriptive statistics for 
the full sample (column 1) and separately for individuals living in states that ever adopt 
CCAs (column 2) and individuals living in states that do not adopt CCAs (column 3).  
For the full sample, we find that about 41 percent of respondents report trying to lose 
weight.17  Fully 75 percent of the sample reports any past month exercise, while 
individuals report consuming 3.67 servings of fruits and vegetables per day.  Average 
BMI in the sample is 27.61 (i.e., overweight), and nearly 30 percent of the sample is 
                                                     
16 Results were qualitatively similar when we estimated models in logs instead of levels or estimated 
outcomes on a per capita basis within each state (available upon request). 
17 In addition we find that 77 percent of the sample report trying to lose or maintain weight (not reported 
in the table).  Of those trying to lose or maintain weight, 26 percent report eating less to lose weight, 
while 29 percent reporting exercising more.   
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obese.  Notably, 3 percent of the sample satisfies the definition of Class-3 obesity (i.e., 
BMI>40).  In general we find few meaningful differences in average outcomes and 
characteristics for people in states with CCAs compared to those in states without 
CCAs. 
 In Table 3 we present estimates of the effects of CCAs that take explicit 
advantage of the plausibly exogenous variation in the timing of policy adoption across 
states on three measures of weight-related investments in health: the likelihood that an 
individual reports trying to lose weight (top panel), the number of servings of fruits 
and vegetables per day the individual reports consuming (middle panel), and the 
likelihood the person reported vigorous exercise in the past month (bottom panel).  
Each estimate in the table is the coefficient on the CCA variable from a separate 
difference in differences model with linear state trends.  The first column reports 
estimates for the full sample, and the subsequent columns report estimates for models 
that restrict attention to people in each of the various (mutually exclusive) weight 
categories.  We also report in the row just above each panel of estimates the average 
for each outcome variable across the various weight categories (and for the full sample 
for column 1).  Notably, stated weight loss attempts are increasing in objective weight 
category, while fruit and vegetable consumption and exercise are both decreasing in 
objective weight category conditional on being at least normal weight.  These patterns 
lend face validity that the data are plausibly measuring meaningful underlying 
constructs. 
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 The results in the top panel of Table 3 provide strong evidence that 
Commonsense Consumption Acts increased stated weight loss attempts among heavy 
individuals.  For example, the estimate in the top panel of column 7 of Table 3 
indicates that CCAs were associated with a 3.3 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood an individual with Class-3 obesity reports trying to lose weight.  Relative to 
the average rate for this group, this represents about a 4.3 percent effect.  For obese 
individuals in column 5 we find a 4 percentage point increase in weight loss intentions, 
or a 6.2 percent effect relative to the mean, and this estimate is statistically significant.  
Notably, we find that most of the estimated effects of CCAs on weight loss attempts 
for individuals in the lighter weight categories are smaller in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant. 
 The middle and bottom panels of Table 3 further investigate investments in 
weight-related health by examining healthy food consumption and exercise, 
respectively, from the preferred specification with state and year fixed effects and 
linear state trends.  For fruit and vegetable consumption in the middle panel of Table 
3, we find strong evidence that CCAs were associated with statistically significant 
increases in healthy food consumption, and these effects are particularly large in 
magnitude and statistically significant for the heaviest individuals.  Among individuals 
with Class-3 obesity in column 7, we estimate that CCAs increased consumption of 
fruits and vegetables by a statistically significant 0.25 servings per day, or about 7.3 
percent relative to the sample average for that group.  We estimate smaller (in both 
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absolute and relative terms) but statistically significant increases for overweight 
individuals in column 4 and for the full sample in column 1, while the estimates for 
underweight and normal weight individuals are both small and statistically 
insignificant.18  Turning to exercise participation in the bottom panel, we find no 
effects of CCAs: none of the estimates in the bottom panel of Table 3 are economically 
or statistically significant, indicating that CCAs did not meaningfully affect exercise 
activity for any group, let alone those most likely to have been treated by CCAs (i.e., 
heavy individuals).19 
In Table 4 we report results for the effects of CCAs on weight for the full 
sample period 2000-2012.  All estimates are from the preferred specification with state 
and year fixed effects and linear state trends.  Notably, we find no meaningful effects 
of CCAs on average BMI, and these null findings are precise: the estimate in column 
1 can rule out reductions in BMI larger than about 0.05, or about 0.2 percent relative 
                                                     
18 Sample sizes differ across the panels of Table 3 because the weight intentions questions were only 
asked by a subset of states and were not asked in 2004 or after 2005.  There is an emerging understanding 
of appropriate inference in settings with a small number of clusters; when we estimated p-values using 
the Wild-cluster bootstrap method (Cameron et al. 2008), the estimate in the top panel of Table 3 is no 
longer statistically significant at conventional levels.  Note that the weight intention outcome is the only 
one for which we have a small number of clusters due to the BRFSS sampling structure. 
19 Results for the number of minutes of exercise similarly did not indicate any meaningful effects of 
CCAs on exercise.  In results not reported but available upon request we performed many robustness 
exercises for the results in Table 3.  Restricting the healthy food consumption analysis to the same years 
the weight loss attempts questions were asked (2000-2003 and 2005) did not change the main result on 
healthy food consumption.  Those same results were also robust to excluding 2011 and 2012 to account 
for a change in the BRFSS sampling structure that accounts for cellphones.  Results were also robust 
to the choice of included states; for example, dropping each CCA adopter one at a time did not change 
the results.  Results were also similar when we excluded the linear state trends, as well as when we 
allowed for quadratic state trends in addition to linear trends.  Adding a control for whether the state 
would adopt a CCA in the next year did not materially alter the significant coefficients in the top and 
middle panels of Table 3, and the coefficient on future CCA adoption itself was not statistically 
significant. 
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to the average BMI in the population (27.9).20  We similarly find very small CCA 
estimates on the likelihood of being at or above any of the standard weight thresholds.  
Even when measured against the very low rate of Class-3 obesity in the population 
(3.81 percent), the estimate in column 7 of Table 4 can rule out reductions in the 
likelihood of Class-3 obesity larger than about 2.6 percent.21 
4.2 Fast Food Prices 
In Table 5 we turn to prices of fast-food and other food items from the 
ACCRA data.  Table 5 shows the coefficient on the CCA indicator separately for 
several food-related prices in fully saturated models that include controls for city and 
year-quarter fixed effects and linear city-specific time trends as well as all the other 
policy controls and state level controls.  Three prices are for fast-food items that 
should have been directly affected by CCAs (a McDonald’s Quarter Pounder with 
Cheese, a Pizza Hut medium cheese pizza, and a Kentucky Fried Chicken thigh and 
drumstick), and we also show results for prices of three food items that should not 
have been directly affected by CCAs (a half gallon of milk, a loaf of bread, and a ten 
pound sack of potatoes) as well as a summary grocery price index. 
                                                     
20 Event study specifications – which replace the single CCA indicator variable with a series of variables 
representing months relative to CCA adoption in the state – confirm the null findings on population 
average BMI and are presented in Figure 2 for a two year period around CCA adoption.  Event study 
figures for the probability of being at or above other weight thresholds (e.g., obese) were similar and 
are available upon request.  Note that because height and weight were asked in every survey wave we 
have good coverage of data surrounding each state’s CCA; most other outcomes that were not asked in 
every year do not support such detailed models. 
21 Controlling for fast food prices had no meaningful effect on any of the BRFSS-based outcomes. 
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The results in Table 5 provide little evidence that CCAs affected prices at fast 
food restaurants.  Estimates on the CCA variable for the three fast-food prices are all 
small in magnitude.  The estimate in column 1 for a hamburger indicates that CCAs 
were associated with decreases in prices of about 1 percent, and the standard errors 
can rule out reductions in prices of larger than about 3 percent.22  Coefficient estimates 
on the other food prices and the grocery price index are also small and statistically 
insignificant with the exception of the price of a sack of potatoes which we estimate a 
statistically significant reduction in price of about 6.6 percent.23 
4.3 Fast Food Market Size 
In Table 6 we turn to the effects of CCAs on market size as measured by the 
QCEW data on the number of establishments, the number of employees, and average 
weekly wages across industries in each state and year from 2000-2012.  If CCAs 
provide valuable protection to new entrepreneurs considering opening a restaurant or 
to existing firm owners in fast-food restaurants who are considering closing 
establishments, we might expect to see CCAs increasing the number of fast-food 
establishments.  Moreover, we would expect weaker or no effects on establishments 
in other industries. 
                                                     
22 Demand effects could differ across restaurants for a number of reasons; for example, some restaurant 
chains are likely more able to substitute items across a healthy/unhealthy food spectrum than others.  
As such, the predictions on specific fast food prices need not be the same. 
23 ACCRA also consistently tracked prices of other food items over our sample period, including: one 
pound of Blue Bonnet or Parkay margarine, one pound of bananas, one head of lettuce, one 11.5 ounce 
can of Maxwell House, Hills Brothers, or Folgers coffee, and one 29 ounce can of Hunt’s, Del Monte, 
Libby’s, or Lady Alberta peaches.  Results on those other items are not shown but are available upon 
request.  None indicated a statistically or economically significant association with CCAs. 
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Table 6 presents estimates of the effects of CCAs on the number of 
establishments separately for fast-food restaurants, full service restaurants, grocery 
stores, and gas stations with convenience stores.  Each entry in Table 6 presents the 
coefficient on the CCA indicator in a fully-saturated separate model with state and year 
fixed effects and linear state trends; the top panel reports estimates for the number of 
establishments, the middle panel reports estimates for the number of employees, and 
the bottom panel reports estimates for the average weekly wage.  At the top of each 
panel we also report the average within each industry for the respective outcomes. 
 The results in Table 6 provide some evidence that CCAs increased 
employment in fast-food, consistent with our preferred supply-side mechanism.  The 
point estimates on the CCA variable for number of establishments and number of 
employees suggest 2.2 percent and 4.5 percent increases, respectively, and the latter is 
statistically significant at the ten percent level.24  We find no effects on average weekly 
wages in fast-food, nor do we find effects on outcomes in other industries.  The 
patterns in Table 6 suggest that CCAs may have increased employment in fast-food, 
primarily by increasing employment per store (as opposed to increasing numbers of 
stores). 
 Finally, in Table 7 we perform the parallel exercise on the number of 
McDonald’s restaurants in each state from 2000-2012, controlling for state and year 
fixed effects, linear state trends, and all the state/time varying controls include in the 
                                                     
24 Although we do not observe specific restaurants in the QCEW data, it is worth noting that the supply 
side effects could also vary across restaurants. 
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QCEW models above.  Column 1 reports the effect of CCAs on the total number of 
McDonald’s restaurants in the state, while columns 2 and 3 separate company-owned 
from franchise-owned stores, respectively.  The results in column 1 indicate that CCAs 
did not significantly change the total number of McDonald’s stores in a state, but the 
results in columns 2 and 3 indicate that CCAs significantly increased the number of 
McDonald’s restaurants within the state that are company owned and decreased the 
number of McDonald’s restaurants within the state that are franchise-owned.25 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The results above provide the literature’s first evidence on the effects of 
Commonsense Consumption Acts – more commonly known as ‘Cheeseburger Bills’ 
– which greatly limit food companies’ liability in weight-based claims.  An interesting 
example of tort reform for a single industry, CCAs were adopted with the explicit goal 
of inducing people to take more personal responsibility for their weight (a central tenet 
of tort reform more generally).  We are the first to examine how CCAs affected weight-
related investments in health, finding that the laws did induce heavy people to take 
more care by consuming healthy food and trying to lose weight.  We also show CCAs 
had no effects on population weight or food prices.  We provide some evidence that 
CCAs increased employment in fast-food restaurants in a state.  Finally, we show that 
                                                     
25 Unfortunately, we do not have data on the frequency of obesity-related lawsuits, nor do we know 
who is named in such lawsuits (i.e., the McDonald’s corporation or the individual franchisee).  We are 
not aware of data that would allow us to measure lawsuits against different types of named defendants, 
which would be useful for interpretation. 
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for one specific restaurant targeted by obesity-related lawsuits (McDonald’s), CCAs 
were associated with significant increases in the likelihood that restaurants are 
company-owned as opposed to franchise-owned. 
There are some important limitations to the current study that should be 
noted.  First, all of the weight, consumption, and exercise data are self-reported, 
though we have adjusted the reports of weight using the method outlined in Cawley 
and Burkhauser (2008).  It is unlikely that reporting biases or errors are systematically 
correlated with the timing of CCA adoption, however.  Second, although we observe 
healthy food consumption as measured by the number of servings of fruits and 
vegetables consumed per day, we do not observe either total food consumption or 
unhealthy food consumption.  We interpret increases in healthy food consumption as 
likely evidence of substitution from unhealthy to healthy foods given the findings on 
stated weight loss intentions, though we cannot directly show that unhealthy 
consumption falls following adoption of CCAs.26  Third, we do not observe the 
activities of state public health departments to reduce adult obesity.  While we have 
controlled flexibly for state trends and other state initiatives that have been previously 
studied in the literature on determinants of weight, we cannot rule out that there are 
                                                     
26 While we cannot directly comment on unhealthy food consumption, we can disaggregate the 
components of fruit and vegetable consumption for the period 2000-2009 when the specific items were 
asked consistently.  In results not reported but available upon request we find that the CCA-induced 
increases in fruits and vegetables consumption is concentrated among fruits, fruit juices, and green 
salads as opposed to potatoes and carrots. To the extent that the former are likely to be relatively 
healthier than the latter, this is suggestive evidence in favor of an overall improvement attributable to 
CCAs. 
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other state-specific factors (e.g., outreach) that are correlated both with CCA adoption 
and with the weight-related outcomes we study here.27 
Fourth, we do not have data on the frequency and nature of obesity-related 
lawsuits.  This means that we do not, for example, know how frequently individual 
franchisees are named in such lawsuits (as opposed to the larger corporate entity), and 
we similarly do not know how concentrated the legal activity is toward individual 
companies.  This information would be useful for interpreting our findings on prices, 
market size, and McDonald’s restaurants.28 
Finally, we do not observe other firm responses to CCAs beyond the outcomes 
in the QCEW and UFOC for McDonald’s.  For example, it is plausible that 
McDonald’s restaurants located in states with CCAs were slower to roll out ‘healthier’ 
menu options (such as salad, milk, and fruit), eliminate the ‘Super Size’ option, or 
adopt packaging with calories posted on the menu (to the extent that such decisions 
are not made nationally at the company level) following CCA adoption, but we do not 
observe these outcomes.  We also do not know how seriously food companies take 
such weight-based claims (either in the presence or absence of CCAs), though we do 
know that there have been multiple high profile lawsuits filed and that the food 
industry has lobbied strenuously for CCAs, suggesting a nontrivial legal threat.  
                                                     
27 We did not, however, find significant associations between state expenditures on health or personal 
health care and the presence of a state CCA. 
28 The UFOC documents do list pending litigation against the company to inform potential franchisees 
about legal risk, but annual versions of these documents over our sample period were prohibitively 
expensive (approximately $270 per restaurant per year). 
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Relatedly, we do not observe how liability insurance premiums responded to CCAs.  
While the protection afforded by the laws should have reduced insurance premiums 
for fast food companies, we cannot directly demonstrate this channel.  A better 
understanding as to whether and to what extent fast food companies and the insurance 
industry responded to CCAs is an important area for future research. 
Despite these limitations, our results are the first in the literature to evaluate 
the effects of CCAs and should provide valuable information to policymakers 
considering similar adoptions (as occurred as recently as 2013 in North Carolina).  In 
doing so, our results provide novel new empirical evidence supporting a central tenet 
of tort reform that parties take more care and also show that industry-specific tort 
reforms can affect market-wide outcomes. 
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Figure 1 
Searches for ‘Cheeseburger Bill’ – Google Trends 
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Figure 2 
Event Study Estimates of CCAs on Population Average BMI 
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Table 1: 
Timing of CCA Adoption 
 Enacted Effective Citation 
AL -- 5/23/20
12 
ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-730 to 6-5-736 (2012) 
AZ 4/8/2004 -- ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-683, 12-688 (2012) 
CO 5/17/200
4 
5/17/20
04 
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-1101 to 13-21-1106 
(West 2012) 
FL 5/21/200
4 
5/21/20
04 
FLA. STAT. ANN § 768.37 (West 2012) 
GA 5/14/200
4 
5/14/20
04 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2-430 to 26-2-436 (West 
2102) 
ID 4/2/2004 7/1/200
4 
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-8701 to 39-8706 (2012) 
IL 7/30/200
4 
1/1/200
5 
ILL. COMP. STT. ANN 43/1 to 43/20 (West 2012) 
IN 3/17/200
6 
7/1/200
6 
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-30-23-1 to 34-30-23-3 
(West 2012) 
KS 4/15/200
5 
-- KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4801 (2012) 
KY 3/8/2005 -- KY. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 411.600 to 411.640 (West 
2012) 
LA 6/2/2003 6/3/200
3 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 9:2799.6 (2012) 
ME 6/9/2005 -- ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 170 (2012) 
MI 10/7/200
4 
10/7/20
04 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2974 (West 
2012) 
MO 6/25/200
4 
1/1/200
5 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.595 (West 2012) 
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ND 3/3/1/20
05 
3/31/20
05 
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-23-01 to 19-23-03 (2012) 
OH -- 4/7/200
5 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.36 (West 2012) 
OK 5/22/200
9 
11/1/20
09 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 34 to 37 (West 2012) 
OR 7/27/200
5 
-- OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.961 (West 2012) 
SD 3/9/2004 -- S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-61-1 to 21-61-4 
(2012) 
TN 4/30/200
4 
7/1/200
4 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-205 (West 2012) 
TX 6/18/200
5 
6/18/20
05 
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 
138.001 to 138.004 (Vernon 2012) 
UT 3/19/200
4 
5/3/200
4 
UTAH CODE ANN §§78b-4-301 to 78B-4-306 
(West 2012) 
WA 3/26/200
4 
6/10/20
04 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.070 (West 2012) 
WI -- 3/28/20
08 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.506 (West 2012) 
WY 2/24/200
5 
-- WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-47-101 to 11-47-103 
(2012) 
Source: Wilking & Daynard (2013).  This list excludes Minnesota which passed a CCA that was 
subsequently vetoed by its Governor in 2011.  It also excludes North Carolina which adopted a CCA 
that did not take effect until October 2013, after the end of our sample period. 
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Table 2: 
Descriptive Statistics, 2000-2012 BRFSS Data 
Variable 
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Individuals in 
states that 
ever adopt a 
CCA 
(3) 
Individuals in 
states that 
never adopt a 
CCA 
Weight Intentions    
Trying to lose weight 0.41 0.40 0.42 
# servings of fruits and vegetables 
per day 
3.67 3.59 
3.76 
Any exercise last month 0.75 0.75 0.75 
    
Weight Outcomes    
BMI 27.61 27.70 27.52 
Underweight (BMI: less than 18.5) 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Normal weight (BMI:18.5 - 24.9) 0.34 0.33 0.34 
Overweight (BMI: 25.0 to 29.9) 0.36 0.36 0.37 
Obese (BMI: 30.0 & above) 0.18 0.18 0.18 
BMI > 35 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Class-3 obesity (BMI > 40) 0.03 0.03 0.03 
    
Demographics     
Female 0.51 0.51 0.51 
Age 45.99 46.06 45.92 
Less than high school degree 0.12 0.12 0.13 
High school degree 0.30 0.31 0.28 
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Some college 0.27 0.28 0.26 
BA or more    
Married 0.58 0.59 0.56 
Black 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Asian 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Other race 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Hispanic 0.14 0.11 0.18 
Weighted means.  
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Table 3: 
CCAs Induced Modest Improvements in Weight-Related Health Investments among Heavy Individuals 
BRFSS 2000-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                          Sample is  Full sample Under 
weight 
Normal 
Weight 
Overweight Obese Severe 
Obese 
Class III 
Obese 
  BMI<18.5 18.5≤BMI<
25 
25≤BMI<30 30≤BMI<35 35≤BMI<40 40≤BMI 
Trying to lose weight (avg ) .42 .03 .20 .46 .65 .72 .77 
CCA 
 
0.009 
(0.019) 
0.008 
(0.023) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
0.040** 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
0.033 
(0.025) 
R squared .05 .06 .08 .09 .05 .04 .04 
N 590653 9669 191266 188779 87925 31517 15076 
        
# fruit/veggie per day (avg ) 3.676 3.678 3.862 3.668 3.533 3.441 3.380 
CCA 
 
0.058** 
(0.028) 
0.113 
(0.113) 
0.061 
(0.042) 
0.130*** 
(0.033) 
0.063 
(0.0654) 
0.0014 
(0.051) 
0.246** 
(0.105) 
R squared .05 .07 .05 .05 .05 .04 .05 
N 2339201 33913 679503 752056 387990 149813 76680 
        
Exercised past month (avg ) .74 .66 .80 .77 .70 .63 .54 
CCA 
 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.023) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.13) 
R squared .08 .09 .08 .08 .07 .08 .08 
N 4404754 63149 1260866 1414696 737495 285528 146694 
        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Results are from linear probability models and use BRFSS sampling weights.  All 
models include controls for individual demographic characteristics (age, gender, race, education level, marital status); state, month, and year fixed 
effects; linear state-specific time trends; soda and cigarette taxes; menu labelling laws; complete streets laws; other tort-reforms; state unemployment 
rates; and state demographic characteristics (fraction female, fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals of age  21 to 64 and 64 
to 65, fraction of individuals with high school degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level).  Standard errors 
clustered at the state level. All include weights provided by BRFSS. 
  
118 
 
 
Table 4: 
CCAs Had No Effects on Population Weight 
BRFSS 2000-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome  is  BMI Pr(BMI≥18.
5) 
Pr(BMI≥
20 
Pr(BMI≥2
5) 
Pr(BMI≥3
0) 
Pr(BMI≥3
5) 
Pr(BMI≥4
0) 
        
Sample average  27.88 .984 .954 .661 .299 .110 .038 
        
CCA 
 
0.029 
(0.042) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
R squared .062 .009 .025 .065 .038 .026 .018 
N 3,931,002 3,931,002 3,931,002 3,931,002 3,931,002 3,931,002 3,931,002 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  See notes to Table 3. 
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Table 5: 
CCAs Had No Systematic Effects on Fast Food or Other Food Prices 
ACCRA/C2ER 2000-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Outcome is  McDonald’s 
quarter 
pounder 
with cheese 
Pizza Hut 
medium 
cheese pizza 
Kentucky 
Fried 
Chicken 
thigh and 
drumstick 
Half gallon 
of milk 
Loaf of 
bread 
Ten pound 
sack of 
potatoes 
Grocery 
price index 
Average price  2.52 11.01 1.18 2.16 1.28 3.81 99.95 
        
CCA -0.028 
(0.027) 
-0.007 
(0.086) 
0.024 
(0.017) 
0.039 
(0.031) 
-0.024 
(0.018) 
-0.252*** 
(0.060) 
-0.767 
(0.839) 
R-squared .69 0.76 0.67 0.77 0.75 0.76 0.88 
N 14938 14938 14938 14938 14938 14398 14398 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Each entry is from a separate model and shows the coefficient on the CCA variable 
on the local price for the item at the top of each column.  All models include controls for city and quarter fixed effects; linear city-specific time trends; 
soda and cigarette taxes; menu labelling laws; complete street laws; other tort-reforms; and state unemployment rates; and state demographic 
characteristics (fraction female, fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals of age  21 to 64 and 64 to 65, fraction of individuals 
with high school degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level).  Standard errors are clustered throughout at the 
state level. All include state population weights. 
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Table 6: 
Some Evidence that CCAs Increased Employment in Fast Food 
QCEW 2000-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Industry is  Limited-service 
restaurants (fast-
food) 
Full-service 
restaurants 
Grocery stores Gas station with 
convenience store 
Number of establishments 
(avg ) 
3781.9 3983.6 689.7 1786.9 
CCA 
 
82.97 
(79.18) 
-20.19 
(85.73) 
11.01  
(24.68) 
-.33.01 
(46.43) 
R squared .99 .99 .99 .99 
N 662 662 660 660 
     
Number of Employees (avg 
) 
65316.5 84469.62 13763.27 146682.5 
CCA 2908.49* 
(1584.87) 
1655.95 
(1644.22) 
321.87 
(372.15) 
-523.33  
(409.95) 
R squared .99 .99 .99 .99 
N 662 662 660 660 
     
Average weekly wage (avg ) 246.83 300.31 894.26 350.78 
CCA 
 
-2.29 
(1.89) 
-0.18 
(2.00) 
10.84 
(7.37) 
-1.46 
(4.33) 
R squared .98 .99 .97 .93 
N 662 662 660 660 
     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Each entry is from a separate model and shows the coefficient on the CCA variable 
on the outcome at the top of each panel (number of establishments, number of employees, and average weekly wage) for the industries in each column 
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(limited service restaurants, full service restaurants, grocery stores, and gas stations with convenience stores).  All models include controls for state and 
year fixed effects; linear state-specific time trends; soda and cigarette taxes; menu labelling laws; complete street laws; other tort-reforms; and state 
unemployment rates; and state demographic characteristics (fraction female, fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals of age  
21 to 64 and 64 to 65, fraction of individuals with high school degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level).  
Standard errors are clustered throughout at the state level. All include state population weights. 
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Table 7: 
CCAs Increased Company-Owned and Reduced Franchise-Owned McDonald’s 
UFOC/FDD 2000-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) 
                        Outcome is 
 
Total # McDonald’s in the 
state 
# Company-Owned 
McDonald’s in the state 
# Franchise-Owned 
McDonald’s in the state 
(avg ) 269.07 36.43 232.65 
    
CCA 
 
2.27 
(2.64) 
11.16*** 
(3.62) 
-8.891** 
(3.86) 
R squared 0.99 0.98 0.99 
N 662 662 662 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Each entry is from a separate model and shows the coefficient on the CCA variable.  
All models include controls for state and year fixed effects; linear state-specific time trends; soda and cigarette taxes; menu labelling laws; complete 
street laws; other tort-reforms; and state unemployment rates, fraction female, fraction black, Hispanic, and other races, fraction of individuals of age  
21 to 64 and 64 to 65, fraction of individuals with high school degree and with some college or more, and fraction below the federal poverty level). 
Standard errors are clustered throughout at the state level. All include state population weights.  
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Commonsense Consumption Act (Missouri) 
 
TITLE 36.  STATUTORY ACTIONS AND TORTS (Chs. 521-538)    
CHAPTER 537.  TORTS AND ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES   
COMMONSENSE CONSUMPTION FUND 
 
§ 537.595 R.S.Mo.  (2014) 
 
§ 537.595. Citation -- definitions -- immunity from liability for claims relating to 
weight gain or obesity, when, exceptions -- petition, contents -- effective date  
 
   1. This section may be known as the "Commonsense Consumption Act". 
2. As used in this section, the following terms mean: 
   (1) "Claim", any claim by or on behalf of a natural person, as well as any 
derivative or other claim arising therefrom asserted by or on behalf of any other 
person; 
   (2) "Generally known condition allegedly caused by or allegedly likely to result 
from long-term consumption", a condition generally known to result or to likely 
result from the cumulative effect of consumption and not from a single instance of 
consumption; 
   (3) "Knowing or willful violation of federal or state law", that: 
      (a) The conduct constituting the violation was committed with the intent to 
deceive or injure consumers or with actual knowledge that such conduct was 
injurious to consumers; and 
      (b) The conduct constituting the violation was not required by regulations, 
orders, rules, or other pronouncements of, or statutes administered by, a federal, 
state, or local government agency; 
   (4) "Other person", any individual, corporation, company, association, firm, 
partnership, society, joint-stock company, or any other entity, including any 
governmental entity or private attorney general. 
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3. Except as exempted in subsection 4 of this section, a manufacturer, packer, 
distributor, carrier, holder, seller, marketer, retailer, or advertiser of a food, as 
defined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321(f)), as 
amended, but shall not include alcoholic beverages, or an association of one or more 
such entities shall not be subject to civil liability under any state law, including all 
statutes, regulations, rules, common law, public policies, court or administrative 
decisions or decrees, or other state actions having the effect of law, for any claim 
arising out of weight gain, obesity, or a health condition associated with weight gain 
or obesity. 
4. The provisions of subsection 3 of this section shall not preclude civil liability 
where the claim of weight gain, obesity, health condition associated with weight gain 
or obesity, or other generally known condition allegedly caused by or allegedly likely 
to result from long-term consumption of food is based on: 
   (1) A material violation of an adulteration or misbranding requirement 
prescribed by statute or regulation of the state of Missouri or the United States and 
the claimed injury was proximately caused by such violation; or 
   (2) Any other material violation of federal or state law applicable to the 
manufacturing, marketing, distribution, advertising, labeling, or sale of food, 
provided that such violation is knowing and willful, and the claimed injury was 
proximately caused by such violation. The provisions of subsection 3 of this section 
shall not preclude civil liability for breach of express contract or express warranty in 
connection with the purchase of food. 
5. In any action exempted under subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection 4 of this 
section, the petition initiating such action shall state with particularity the following: 
the statute, regulation, or other state or federal law that was allegedly violated, the 
facts that are alleged to constitute a material violation of such statute or regulation, 
and the facts alleged to demonstrate that such violation proximately caused actual 
injury to the plaintiff. In any action exempted under subdivision (2) of subsection 4 
of this section, the petition initiating such action shall also state with particularity 
facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the violation occurred with the 
intent to deceive or injure consumers or with the actual knowledge that such 
violation was injurious to consumers. For purposes of applying this section the 
pleading requirements under this section are deemed part of state substantive law 
and not merely procedural provisions. 
6. In any action exempted under subsection 4 of this section, all discovery and 
other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss 
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unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is 
necessary to preserve evidence, resolve the motion to dismiss, or to prevent undue 
prejudice to that party. During the pendency of any stay of discovery under this 
subsection and unless otherwise ordered by the court, any party to the action with 
actual notice of the allegations contained in the petition shall treat all documents, 
data compilations, including electronically recorded or stored data, and tangible 
objects that are in the custody or control of such party that are relevant to the 
allegations as if they were the subject of a continuing request for production of 
documents from an opposing party under the Missouri rules of civil procedure. 
7. The provisions of this section shall apply to all covered claims pending on or 
filed after January 1, 2005, regardless of when the claim arose. 
 
HISTORY: L. 2004 H.B. 1115 § 537.900 
 
NOTES: 
EFFECTIVE 1-1-05 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF OBESITY ON WAGES: THE ROLE OF PERSONAL 
INTERACTIONS AND JOB SELECTION 
with Andrea Moro and Tommaso Tempesti 
1. Introduction  
This paper investigates how the relationship between obesity and wages is affected by 
the level of inter-personal interactions required in the workplace. A vast literature 
studies how obesity affects labor market outcomes.1 In an influential paper, Cawley 
(2004) finds a negative effect of obesity on wages for white women. One conjecture 
for this result is that obesity results in social stigma, affecting men and women 
differently (the so-called “beauty premium”).2 Undoubtedly, at least in modern western 
societies, body weight may affect a person's appearance and other people's perception 
of the person's market-relevant traits.3 The effect of stigma or perceptions on wages 
is more prominent for workers employed in jobs requiring frequent inter-personal 
interactions. There may also be indirect effects if more obese workers are induced to 
self-select into jobs requiring fewer interactions, which in turn affects the observed 
job-specific relationship between obesity and wages.4  
                                                     
1 See Averett, Susan et al. (1996), Cawley (2004), Pagan et al. (1997), Register et al. (1990) 
2 A growing literature documents the relationship between wages and physical appearance, which is at 
the root of the “beauty premium” conjecture Hamermesh et al. (1994). 
3 See Baum et al. (2011) for an analysis of the socio-economic causes of obesity.   
4 Another explanation from the sociological literature is that obesity has a more adverse impact on the 
self-esteem of white female than on that of other groups, but Averett, Susan et al. (1996) do not find 
empirical support for such conjecture. 
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There exist at least two channels that may generate a higher “beauty premium” in jobs 
that require social interaction. One possibility is that overweight individuals, being 
perceived as less attractive in the workplace, may be discriminated against by co-
workers, customers, or employers who have a taste against interacting with individuals 
with abnormal weight (Becker (1957)). Therefore, jobs that require more frequent 
interactions will display a stronger relationship between weight and labor market 
outcomes. A second theory is that co-workers, customers, or employers statistically 
discriminate against overweight individuals because they believe they are, on average, 
less productive (see Phelps (1972)). According to this theory, there are no preferences 
or perceptions against overweight individuals, but a (perhaps biased) belief that these 
workers, carrying a visible marker, are, on average, less productive. If the relevant 
outcome variable (such as productivity) is imperfectly observed, weight is used as a 
proxy in order to improve the decision-makers’ choice. Therefore, otherwise-identical 
individuals, but carrying a different body weight, are treated differently. Both 
conjectures carry the same implication: workers in jobs that require more interactions 
with customers or co-workers will be more greatly affected by their appearance.  
When these effect are economically relevant, workers may, depending on their body 
mass, self-select into jobs requiring different levels of interpersonal interactions. We 
investigate the effect of obesity on wages after accounting explicitly for this selection 
of workers into jobs. We adopt a job selection model to correct for the selection bias 
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that occurs when selection is ignored.5 To this end, we merge two sources of data. One 
is the National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth 1979, a nationally representative 
sample of men and women aged between 14 and 22 when first interviewed. This 
dataset contains detailed information about the respondents, including their weight, 
height, employment status, occupation and wages, and has been widely used  to 
explore the connection between obesity and wages. The second source of data is the 
O*Net database, which contains information about occupations. O*Net classifies 
occupations according to hundreds of standardized descriptors illustrating each 
occupations' characteristics and the worker's required skills.6 From this information 
we use factor analysis to construct a variable measuring the level of interpersonal 
interactions required by each occupation. 
The literature on the effects of obesity on wages typically regresses wages on obesity 
status, sometimes using fixed effects or instrumental variables to account for the 
possibility of reverse causality (i.e poorer individuals have less time and monetary 
resources to eat healthy food, attend the gym, etc.). We complement this approach by 
                                                     
5 Previous research has noted that people with different body mass choose different jobs. Han et al. 
(2011), Morris (2006) Our contribution is to account explicitly for the endogenous selection of people 
with different obesity into different types of jobs 
6 O*Net provides for each occupation, values to descriptors such as “Contact with Others” (How much 
does this job require the worker to be in contact with others, face-to-face, by telephone, or otherwise 
in order to perform it?), Face-to-Face Discussions (How often do you have to have face-to-face 
discussions with individuals or teams in this job?), or Work With Work Group or Team (How important 
is it to work with others in a group or team in this job?). The full set of descriptors used in our analysis 
is listed in Appendix. 
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adopting a Roy model of self-selection.7 In this framework, a person chooses between 
two types of jobs; in our environment, jobs requiring a high or low level of 
interpersonal interactions. Each job-type requires specific skills, which are distributed 
differently among workers of different body mass. Workers of different body mass 
may have a comparative advantages in performing different types of jobs.  Workers 
self-select the job that gives them the highest expected earnings. Ignoring this selection 
biases a standard regression of wages on Body Mass Index (BMI), the standard 
measure of obesity. For example, obese individuals may disproportionally find it more 
advantageous to seek employment in jobs requiring fewer interactions, where obesity 
has less impact. Because we do not observe the wages that obese workers would obtain 
in jobs requiring interpersonal interactions, a standard OLS regression of wages on 
BMI would return a biased coefficient. 
To correct for the selection bias, we adopt the two-step approach introduced by Willis 
et al. (1979). A selection equation explains the discrete choice between the two job-
types. A wage equation is estimated accounting for the selection bias recovered from 
the first equation. To improve the identification of the bias correction, we include in 
the first stage equation a variable that affects the relationship between obesity and 
wages only indirectly, through job choice. Because the NLSY has family information, 
we include in the selection equation information about family members' job 
                                                     
7 See Roy (1951); Heckman (1990). Two seminal papers of this empirical literature are Willis et al. (1979); 
Heckman et al. (1985); Borjas (1987). 
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characteristics.8 The intuition for this exclusion restriction is that individual may find 
it easier, regardless of their obesity, to find jobs requiring skills that are similar to the 
jobs of their family members, either because of direct referrals, or because family 
members correlate on other required skills. 
To account for reverse-causality between obesity and wages, that is, the possibility that 
low-wages cause obesity (perhaps because poorer families consume more fattening 
food), and the possibility that unobserved correlates affect both obesity and wages, 
our wage equation includes individual fixed effects in our benchmark specification.9 
Our results confirm, using up-to-date information, the literature's result that the 
negative relationship between obesity and wages is significant only in some 
demographic groups, notably white women. However, accounting for selection, we 
see that the negative relationship between obesity and wages is mostly coming from 
the subset of workers in jobs needing a high level of social interactions. In such jobs, 
the relationship is stronger than average, and understated in a regression that does not 
correct for the selection bias. In jobs that require a lower level of social skills, the 
relationship between jobs and wages is smaller, not statistically significant, and 
overstated when not accounting for the selection bias. Our analysis is most related to 
the research in Cawley (2004), Han et al. (2009) and Shinall (2014). Cawley (2004) 
focuses on the effect of obesity on wages. To account for sources of bias, such as 
                                                     
8 We include the “closest” sibling’s job type. This is described in detail in the empirical approach section.  
9 The same approach is adopted in Cawley (2004)'s benchmark specification 
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omitted variables and reverse causality, he follows different strategies: controlling for 
lagged values of BMI, using siblings' weight as an instrument for the respondent's 
weight, and, in his preferred specification, including individual fixed effects. However, 
he does not control for job type. Han et al. (2009) introduce the use of job 
characteristics. They use data from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT - a 
precursor of O*Net, the database we use) to obtain information about the jobs the 
individuals are performing. They find that the association with BMI and wages is 
stronger for jobs that require more interpersonal skills. Finally, Shinall (2014) also uses 
job characteristics to compare the effects of obesity on wages for that require some 
physical skills versus jobs that require some social skills. However, in that paper the 
data does not offer the possibility of controlling for individual fixed effects and there 
is no specific accounting for selection bias in the wage-obesity estimation. Our paper's 
contribution is (i) to extend the analysis to data including the most recent years, (ii) to 
use a broader range of information on job characteristics, and, (iii) to explicitly model 
workers' job selection to verify if job sorting affects the magnitude of the effects of 
obesity on wages. 
2. Data  
The National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth is a nationally representative sample 
of the American youth. Respondents were sampled first in 1979 when they were 
between 14 and 22 years of age, every year until 1994, and every two years since. We 
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use 12 years of data ranging from 1982 thru 2006.10 This is a widely used survey in 
research on employment and obesity. The survey contains detailed questions about 
employment and tenure, household environment and structure, and personal health 
information like height and weight. For the empirical analysis we use information on 
gender, race, education status, marital status, number of children in the household, 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), age of youngest child, highest grade 
achieved by mother and father, work tenure, years of experience, region dummies and 
create dummies representing “missing” values for each of the variables to account for 
different types of misreporting. The estimation sample included 97,092 person-years 
(46,180 person-years for women and 50,912 person-years for men) after excluding 
sample individuals who were pregnant at the time of interview, individuals under the 
age of 18, and individuals who did not have full employment or weight information. 
About 91 percent of our sample is employed and has tenure of 141 weeks at current 
job. 
To construct the main dependent outcome we obtain information on the hourly wage 
of each individual and then, similar to Cawley (2004), we top-code the hourly wage at 
500 such that anyone above a 500 hourly wage gets coded at 500. We normalize wages 
to 2010 using a consumer price index. Finally we take the log of real hourly wages and 
                                                     
10 The years that we end up using for our sample are: 1982, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993, 
1994, 1996, 1998 and 2006. We cannot use some of the survey years because the employment status 
recode we use to match the data with the O*Net database was not created in 2000-2004, or in 2008-
present because the CPS section on activity in the week before the survey was not included in those 
rounds. In addition, the survey does not include body weight information in some of the years between 
1982 and 1998.   
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this is the variable we use on the left hand side to estimate the effects of obesity on 
wages. Our estimation sample shows that the average wage for men is $ 18.65 while 
the average wage for women is $ 13.94, when focusing on the difference between 
normal weight category and obese category, we estimate a wage differential of $ -2.33 
for women and a $ 9.08 for men, that is obese men earn -on average- higher hourly 
wages than normal weight men. 
In order to calculate body mass index we pool the responses for all years that recorded 
self-reported weight. Height was assumed to be equal to the height recorded in 1985, 
when respondents were between 20 and 27 years of age. We adopt the standard 
practice in this literature to correct weight and height for self-reporting error using the 
procedure proposed by Lee et al. (1995), exploiting the information on the relationship 
between true and reported height and weight collected in the National Health and 
Nutrition Survey. In our estimation sample the average BMI is around 25.92 for 
women and 26.65 for males. For women almost 22% of our sample falls in the obese 
or higher category while for males it is around 21%.  
We identified the respondents' job in every year in which they are employed, as well 
as the associated hours worked and the hourly wage received at each job. If individuals 
are working multiple jobs, they report one of the jobs as their main job and we use 
that information as their main source of employment. The NLSY offers census 
occupation codes for all jobs. We use it to merge the NLSY data with data from the 
2010 revision of the Occupational Information Network (O*Net) database, containing 
134 
 
detailed information about job characteristics. For each job, the O*Net offers a 
description of tasks, tools and technologies, knowledge, skills, abilities, work activities, 
work context and education required. For each piece information, the database reports 
two numerical values, the “importance” and the “level”. The “importance” is a 
numeric value ranging from 1 to 5 representing how important a specific skill to 
perform the job; the “level” is a numeric value ranging from 1 to 7 representing the 
expertise of the skill needed to perform the job. Essentially, the importance factor is a 
measure of how often the skilled is used, while the “level” measures the needed quality 
of the skill. For example, when comparing a job of a secretary versus a journalist it is 
possible that the “importance” of the skill “writing” is the same for both occupations 
but the “level” is higher for the journalist than the secretary. The database contains a 
total of 277 job descriptors. Figure 1 reports, as an example, one of the questions 
relevant to infer the importance and level of inter-personal interactions required to 
perform the respondent's job.  
We use information from the categories “skills” and “abilities” in O*Net to calculate 
how important interpersonal interactions are to perform any given job and use factor 
analysis to create a univariate index. We selected 17 work activities and job skills that, 
to our judgement, are most important for discerning the important interpersonal 
interactions. These questions assess how relevant it is, to perform a job, to 
communicate with others (supervisors, co-workers, or customers), to resolve conflicts 
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or coordinate other individuals, to speak, negotiate, coordinate others, etc. The full list 
of job descriptors we selected can be found in the Appendix B.  
Using the “level” values for each task and skill, we reduce the dimensionality of the 
information and use factor analysis to extract a single variable measuring the degree of 
required social interactions on the job.11 Once this index is normalized, it resembles a 
z-score variable. We use the median of this standardized score as a threshold to 
categorize jobs in two categories: those requiring high and low levels of interpersonal 
interaction. In our estimation sample we find that 71% of women are occupied in high 
social jobs, whereas only 60% of males are employed in these job. In Figure 2 we plot 
the predicted logarithm wage across the different levels of BMI for jobs requiring a 
high level of interactions versus jobs requiring low levels of social interactions for two 
groups white women and white males.12 
These figures illustrate several facts. First, jobs requiring interactions usually pay higher 
wages than other jobs. Second, the relationship between BMI, wages, and job-type is 
different between males and women. The relationship between wages and BMI is close 
to linear for women, and decreasing in BMI, the same relationship for males looks 
closer to a quadratic (i.e. non-linear) relationship. Finally, the wage-gap between high 
and low-social jobs for white women is decreasing in BMI, suggesting that there is a 
                                                     
11 We replicated the analysis using the “importance” indicators, which lead to similar results. In our 
main specifications we use the “level” measure since they display more variations than the “importance” 
measure.   
12 The other race-gender groups can be found in the appendix   
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higher penalty of BMI on wages for women in jobs requiring interactions, presumably 
because weight and appearance is more important in such jobs. The same penalty is 
not as evident for males’ wages as for women' wages.  
Figure 3, displays the distribution of BMI by type of job and gender. Even though 
there seems to be a higher accumulation of individuals with BMI around each group’s 
average for the high-social job, for both genders, the average BMI between high and 
social jobs is not that different from each other. 
3. Empirical Framework 
In this section we describe the empirical strategy adopted and the structure behind the 
two-step estimation procedure to account for the selection into the different types of 
jobs. We start by assuming that individuals can be employed in two types of jobs 𝒋, 
requiring (𝒋 = 𝟏) or not requiring (𝒋 = 𝟐) a high level of social interactions. Let 
𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒋 be the log wage of individual 𝒊 at time 𝒕  employed in job 𝒋 ∈ {𝟏, 𝟐}, which we 
assume to depend on a set of covariates 𝑿𝒊𝒕, including her or his obesity at time 𝒕, 
𝑩𝑴𝑰𝒊𝒕, and, depending on the adopted specification, individual and time fixed effects: 
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗𝑖𝑡  (1) 
Let 𝑍𝑖𝑡 denote a set of observed variables that influence the job choice of individual 𝑖 
at time 𝑡 without affecting wages, which may include a subset of variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡, and 
let 𝐽𝑖𝑡 be a latent variable determining the job-type choice of the individual: 
𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑡 − 𝜖3𝑖𝑡 
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with job choice 𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 𝐽𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0, and 𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 2 otherwise. Hence, 
𝑃𝑟(𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑃𝑟(𝜖3𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑡) (2) 
Notice that in this approach one will not need to have elements in 𝑋𝑖𝑡   that do not 
belong in 𝑍𝑖𝑡, in other words the methodology can identify the parameters from its 
functional form without having any exclusion restrictions. In our case we do have one 
parameter that is included in 𝑍𝑖𝑡 and that is not included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡, this is the type of job 
the closest sibling has. This exclusion restriction will improve identification of the 
parameter of interest (namely 𝛼).13 
The job choice selects people into different jobs according to preferences. Therefore, 
wages are not observed from a random sample of the population and an OLS 
regression of the wage equation delivers biased coefficients because: 
𝐸(𝑤𝑖𝑡1|𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝜖1𝑖𝑡|𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝜖1𝑖|𝜖3𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑡) 
𝐸(𝑤𝑖𝑡2|𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 2) = 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝜖2𝑖𝑡|𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 2) = 𝛼1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝜖2𝑖𝑡|𝜖3𝑖𝑡   > 𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑡) 
 
                                                     
13 In order to identify the “closest” sibling of each individual we create a measure of distance between 
each individual and all of their siblings. This measure is the sum of the squared difference between the 
siblings’ age, race and gender. This means that the “closest” possible sibling is one that have the same 
age, race and gender. 
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Assuming joint normality of the error term vector [𝜖1, 𝜖2, 𝜖3 ], with zero means and 
variance-covariance matrix equal to Σ = [𝜎𝑖𝑗]. Hence we can compute an analytical 
expression for the bias: 
𝐸(𝑤𝑖𝑡1|𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 2) = 𝛼1𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝜎13
𝜎33
𝜙(
𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝜎33 
)
Φ(
𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝜎33
)
   (3) 
𝐸(𝑤𝑖𝑡2│𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 2) = 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 +
𝜎23
𝜎33
𝜙(
𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝜎33 
) 
1− Φ(
𝛽𝑍𝑖𝑡
𝜎33
) 
 (4) 
 
where φ is the PDF referring to (2) while Φ is the CDF. These equations can be 
estimated with the two-step procedure adopted in Willis et al. (1979): First, estimate 
the probit model (2) and use the estimates to compute the predicted values of the 
inverse mills ratios: 
𝜆1𝑖?̂?  =  
𝜑(
𝛽𝑍𝑖?̂?
𝜎33
)
 𝛷 (
𝛽𝑍𝑖?̂?
𝜎33
 )
  (5) 
𝜆2𝑖?̂?  =  
𝜑(
𝛽𝑍𝑖?̂?
𝜎33
)
 1−𝛷 (
𝛽𝑍𝑖?̂?
𝜎33
 )
 (6) 
Next, estimate the wage equations (1) by Ordinary Least Squares including  𝜆1𝑖?̂?  
and  𝜆2𝑖?̂? to correct for the selection bias. The second stage then becomes: 
𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖𝑡1) = 𝛼1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝜆1𝑖?̂? + 𝜖1𝑖𝑡 
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𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑖𝑡2) = 𝛼2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝜆2𝑖?̂? + 𝜖2𝑖𝑡 
 The procedure provides consistent estimates of the parameter vector 𝛼.  
4. Results 
In this section we present the results from the second-stage estimations. In Table 1, 
we present the results from the estimation for the sample of women.14 The top panel 
shows the results for the sample of women in jobs that require high levels of social 
interactions while the bottom panel presents the results for the sample of women in 
jobs that don’t require high level of social interactions. We report both the results from 
the “unadjusted” OLS regression, and those from the regression that accounts for the 
selection bias (in the “adjusted” columns). Focusing on the results of the unadjusted 
estimation, we find that for white women there is a wage penalty associated with being 
obese of 0.076 percent in jobs requiring high personal interactions, which is statistically 
significant, and consistent with previous literature. In jobs not requiring social 
interaction, the effect is also positive and significant, with a point estimate is 0.088. 
For Black and Hispanic women we find and positive effect of obesity on wages in 
both types of jobs, however these effect are not statistically significant except for the 
coefficient for black women in low social jobs. When comparing the coefficients on 
obese across high and low social jobs for women in the unadjusted regressions, the 
                                                     
14 The results from the first-stage estimation which predicts the parameters needed to obtain the mills 
ratio are in the appendix (Table 7 and 8). The exclusion restriction that we include is statistically 
significant and positive (the expected direction) for all groups gender-race groups except for Hispanics. 
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coefficient on obesity in low social jobs is larger than in high social jobs. This would 
indicate that there is a larger effect from being obesity in low social jobs. For white 
women, this means a higher wage penalty, while for Black and Hispanic women this 
means a larger wage premium for being obese in low social jobs. This goes against the 
expected direction, given the results from Figure 2.  
Once we adjust the estimates to account for job selection, we find that for white 
women in jobs requiring a high level of social interactions the effects of obesity on 
wages are about 50% higher than their unadjusted counterpart. This provides evidence 
that accounting for selection is non-trivial and that previous estimates are closer to a 
“lower” bound of the estimates of obesity on wages for white women. This supports 
the hypothesis that obese white women who are in this type of jobs have –on average- 
unobserved skills that would affect their performance on the job and subsequently 
their wages in a positive direction. Hence once we control for this selection, the effects 
of obesity on wages are larger than not accounting for selection. For Black and 
Hispanic women in high social jobs, the coefficients on obesity become larger but 
remain not statistically significant. When looking at the bottom panel we find that for 
white women, the effects of being obese on wages are still negative but the coefficient 
is approximately 24% smaller when adjusting for selection and it is not statistically 
significant. After adjusting for selection, the coefficient on obesity for low social jobs 
is now smaller than in high social jobs. This points out to evidence that white women 
in high social jobs have a 73% higher wage penalty than in low social jobs, which is 
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consistent with the suggestive evidence from Figure 2. In Table 2 we present the 
results from the estimation for the sample of men. Focusing on the sample of men 
working in high social jobs, the unadjusted column we find that the coefficient on 
obese for males are positive and not statistically significant with the exception of black 
males. In the sample of men working in low social jobs, we also find positive 
coefficient associated with the obese dummy, but only statistical significance for 
Hispanic males. Once we account for selection into these types of jobs, we still find 
positive coefficients for the high-social jobs, but none of these effects are statistically 
significant. Similarly for the low-social jobs, the coefficients remains positive but only 
the coefficient for Hispanic in statistically significant. The mills ratio coefficient is not 
significant is any of the males regressions, not providing strong evidence of sorting 
from males into these types of jobs. 
5. Discussion   
Our results are consistent with the findings in Cawley (2004) and Han et al. (2009) (see 
Table 3 for a comparison of the main results).15 Both of these papers find significant 
negative effects of obesity on wages for white women, and the magnitude of these 
estimates is within the confidence interval of our unadjusted estimates. Similarly these 
papers do not find strong evidence for the effects of obesity in males or Black and 
                                                     
15 There are several differences across the different specifications: Cawley (2004) and Han et al. (2009) 
do not include year 2006. Han et al. (2009) wage equations are conditioned on people who are 
employed. Cawley (2004) and Han et al. (2009) use a blue collar dummy and several state and local 
economic characteristics. 
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Hispanic minorities. This reinforces the evidence for an obesity wage penalty occurring 
for white women, but not other race-gender pair. 
Focusing on white women our results with the estimations accounting for selection 
provide a larger effect of obesity on wages in jobs requiring a high level of social 
interactions, while a lower coefficient on obesity for the other jobs. This provides 
evidence of the prevalence of some characteristics character that makes them more 
suited for the job, and therefore more likely to obtain that job despite their weight 
status.16 
We find that the effect of obesity on wages is larger for jobs that require high levels of 
social interaction, suggesting that the obesity wage penalty is more associated with a 
beauty premium rather than a productivity penalty. We also find that selection affects 
the magnitude of these effects. 
  
                                                     
16 Example of these unobservable could include ability to interact with other individuals, and skills on 
social interactions. 
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Figure 2: Wages and BMI for different groups and job types  
Figure 1: Sample of Question about Importance and Level in O*Net 
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Figure 3: Distribution of BMI by Gender and Type of Job 
 
Table 1: Effects of BMI on Ln(Wages) for Women Using NLSY (1982-2006)
Whites Blacks Hispanic
Adjusted OLS Adjusted OLS Adjusted OLS
High Social
Under weight (BMI: less than 18.5) -0.083∗ -0.053 -0.134 -0.152∗∗ -0.124 -0.036
(0.040) (0.027) (0.089) (0.055) (0.082) (0.047)
Overweight (BMI: 25.0 to 29.9) -0.067∗ -0.035 0.082∗ 0.034 0.042 0.018
(0.029) (0.019) (0.041) (0.024) (0.054) (0.027)
Obese (BMI: 30 and Up) -0.112∗ -0.076∗∗ 0.092 0.022 0.058 0.019
(0.047) (0.029) (0.058) (0.034) (0.086) (0.046)
Mills Ratio -0.416∗ -0.314 -1.556∗
(0.188) (0.373) (0.668)
Low Social
Under weight (BMI: less than 18.5) -0.081 -0.016 -0.035 -0.110 -0.086 -0.033
(0.050) (0.035) (0.068) (0.057) (0.066) (0.056)
Overweight (BMI: 25.0 to 29.9) 0.001 0.004 0.054 0.051∗∗ 0.014 0.026
(0.026) (0.021) (0.030) (0.019) (0.036) (0.025)
Obese (BMI: 30 and Up) -0.067 -0.089∗ 0.095 0.078∗∗ -0.008 0.035
(0.050) (0.035) (0.048) (0.028) (0.063) (0.041)
Mills Ratio 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N: High Social 7041 16789 2396 5934 1780 4756
N : Low Social 4341 9657 2589 6033 1230 3011
Mean: High Social 2.667 2.596 2.515 2.510 2.601 2.584
Mean: Low Social 2.338 2.318 2.259 2.274 2.306 2.327
These estimations from from regressions where the dependent variable is Ln(Wage). The model includes
individual fixed effects and it includes other demographics controls like: number of children, highest grade
achieved of the individual and both parents, work tenure, marital status, region fixed effects and dummies
for missing values of the main explanatory variables. We use clustered at the individual level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2: Effects of BMI on Ln(Wages) for Men Using NLSY (1982-2006)
Whites Blacks Hispanic
Adjusted OLS Adjusted OLS Adjusted OLS
High Social
Under weight (BMI: less than 18.5) -0.029 -0.003 0.024 -0.042 0.781 0.191
(0.096) (0.053) (0.194) (0.117) (0.402) (0.202)
Overweight (BMI: 25.0 to 29.9) 0.050∗ 0.033 0.031 0.090∗ 0.025 0.021
(0.024) (0.017) (0.050) (0.036) (0.061) (0.032)
Obese (BMI: 30 and Up) 0.050 0.024 0.051 0.120∗ 0.072 0.093
(0.039) (0.029) (0.063) (0.052) (0.107) (0.058)
Mills 0.077 0.199 0.087
(0.206) (0.267) (0.583)
Low Social
Under weight (BMI: less than 18.5) -0.104 -0.179∗∗∗ 0.045 0.073 0.076 -0.072
(0.099) (0.054) (0.061) (0.053) (0.186) (0.098)
Overweight (BMI: 25.0 to 29.9) 0.044 0.035∗ 0.029 0.023 0.029 0.017
(0.024) (0.016) (0.024) (0.016) (0.028) (0.020)
Obese (BMI: 30 and Up) 0.017 0.010 0.060 0.020 0.111∗ 0.065∗
(0.035) (0.023) (0.040) (0.026) (0.045) (0.030)
Mills -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N: High Social 6541 15441 1697 4550 1630 3928
N : Low Social 6292 13071 4062 8799 2442 5123
Mean: High Social 2.954 2.900 2.769 2.721 2.853 2.802
Mean: Low Social 2.581 2.590 2.440 2.434 2.574 2.568
These estimations from from regressions where the dependent variable is Ln(Wage). The model includes
individual fixed effects and it includes other demographics controls like: number of children, highest grade
achieved of the individual and both parents, work tenure, marital status, region fixed effects and dummies
for missing values of the main explanatory variables. We use clustered at the individual level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3: Comparison of our results with Cawley (2004) and Han et al. (2009)
Our results
Cawley Han et al. High Low High Low
(2004) (2009) OLS OLS Adjusted Adjusted
White women -0.087 -0.075 -0.076 -0.089 -0.112 -0.067
(0.015) (0.021) (0.029) (0.035) (0.047) (0.050)
Black women 0.002 -0.049 0.022 0.078 0.092 0.095
(0.017) (0.025) (0.034) (0.028) (0.058) (0.048)
Hispanic women -0.020 0.032 0.019 0.035 0.058 -0.008
(0.024) (0.035) (0.046) (0.041) (0.086) (0.063)
White Males 0.013 -0.001 0.024 0.010 0.050 0.017
(0.015) (0.017) (0.029) (0.023) (0.039) (0.035)
Black Males 0.031 0.014 0.120 0.020 0.051 0.060
(0.019) (0.027) (0.052) (0.026) (0.063) (0.040)
Hispanic Males 0.023 0.008 0.093 0.065 0.072 0.111
(0.025) (0.032) (0.058) (0.030) (0.107) (0.045)
These are all coefficients on the category for “Obese” in each paper. The standard errors
are in parentheses. The specification in Cawley (2004) and Han et al. (2009) both include
individual fixed effects. All of these three specifications use NLSY data.
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Appendix A : Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Summary Statistics of NLSY 1987-2006
Women Men
White Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic Total
Employment Variables
Labor Force Participation 0.76 0.71 0.68 0.89 0.82 0.86 0.81
Employed 0.93 0.81 0.88 0.92 0.82 0.88 0.91
Hourly Wage in Dollars 13.36 9.45 12.60 16.23 12.99 20.47 14.50
Log(Wage) Top Coded - in 2010 $ 2.53 2.43 2.50 2.80 2.54 2.67 2.64
Work in a High Social Job 0.78 0.70 0.77 0.71 0.61 0.64 0.73
Weeks worked in Current Job 132.74 124.79 115.40 158.78 113.75 138.40 141.14
Currently Enrolled in School 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.17
Work Experience (1000s hours) 15.84 13.92 13.97 20.77 16.45 19.40 17.82
Body Mass Index
BMI Adjusted 25.29 28.68 27.42 26.57 26.61 27.61 26.28
Under weight (BMI: less than 18.5) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Overweight (BMI: 25.0 to 29.9) 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.39 0.34 0.39 0.31
Obese (BMI: 30 and Up) 0.18 0.36 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.20
Demographics
Age at the Date of the interview (84-10) 30.08 30.42 30.25 29.70 29.93 29.80 29.94
Highest Grade as of May of Svy Year 10.91 10.98 10.00 10.28 9.97 9.62 10.52
Highest Grade Completed by Mother 11.44 9.98 7.46 11.44 9.89 7.37 10.98
Highest Grade Completed by Father 11.32 7.65 6.90 11.50 7.75 6.97 10.62
Number of Children Ever Had 0.89 1.27 1.25 0.63 0.90 0.93 0.83
Age of Youngest Child 2.68 3.80 3.37 1.61 1.38 1.80 2.22
Never Married 0.32 0.52 0.34 0.44 0.61 0.45 0.41
Married 0.55 0.28 0.48 0.46 0.27 0.42 0.47
Separated 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03
Divorced 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09
Widowed 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics of NLSY 1987-2010 for women
Underweight Normal Overweight Obese or More Total
BMI Adjusted 17.58 21.91 27.19 35.74 25.92
Employment Variables
Labor Force Participation 0.69 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.76
Employed 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92
Hourly Wage in Dollars 9.28 14.38 15.23 12.05 13.94
Log(Wage) Top Coded - in 2010 $ 2.44 2.58 2.58 2.52 2.57
Work in a High Social Job 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.66 0.71
Weeks worked in Current Job 99.41 161.31 207.46 234.11 185.44
Currently Enrolled in School 0.20 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.12
Work Experience (1000s hours) 11.02 17.14 22.37 25.75 19.98
Demographics
Age at the Date of the interview (84-10) 27.99 30.64 34.52 37.06 32.82
Highest Grade as of May of Svy Year 12.68 13.39 13.11 12.89 13.19
Highest Grade Completed by Mother 11.21 11.41 10.80 10.25 11.01
Highest Grade Completed by Father 10.84 11.18 10.18 9.43 10.56
Number of Children Ever Had 1.02 1.15 1.56 1.70 1.36
Age of Youngest Child 2.70 3.29 5.11 6.14 4.30
Never Married 0.36 0.30 0.22 0.24 0.27
Married 0.44 0.55 0.60 0.56 0.56
Separated 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04
Divorced 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12
Widowed 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics of NLSY 1987-2010 for Males
Underweight Normal Overweight Obese or More Total
BMI Adjusted 17.39 22.69 27.19 34.19 26.65
Employment Variables
Labor Force Participation 0.70 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.90
Employed 0.79 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.93
Hourly Wage in Dollars 22.90 13.69 21.49 22.77 18.65
Log(Wage) Top Coded - in 2010 $ 2.32 2.73 2.92 2.88 2.83
Work in a High Social Job 0.63 0.59 0.61 0.57 0.60
Weeks worked in Current Job 81.08 168.16 264.37 309.63 232.15
Currently Enrolled in School 0.38 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.11
Work Experience (1000s hours) 9.27 19.17 30.24 37.78 27.00
Demographics
Age at the Date of the interview (84-10) 23.97 28.96 34.20 37.43 32.60
Highest Grade as of May of Svy Year 11.38 12.98 13.24 12.96 13.06
Highest Grade Completed by Mother 10.43 11.10 11.09 10.84 11.04
Highest Grade Completed by Father 10.66 10.88 10.91 10.38 10.79
Number of Children Ever Had 0.34 0.77 1.22 1.44 1.07
Age of Youngest Child 0.37 1.51 3.06 4.19 2.62
Never Married 0.77 0.51 0.28 0.25 0.37
Married 0.15 0.38 0.58 0.62 0.50
Separated 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Divorced 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.10
Widowed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
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Appendix B: Job Descriptors
We report below the set of abilities, skills and work activities we used to construct the index
that encompasses the level of social interaction required on the job.
• Work Activities:
– Communicating with Supervisors, Peers, or Subordinates
– Communicating with Persons Outside Organization
– Establishing and Maintaining Interpersonal Relationships
– Assisting and Caring for Others
– Selling or Influencing Others
– Resolving Conflicts and Negotiating with Others
– Coordinating the Work and Activities of Others
• Skills:
– Speaking
– Social Perceptiveness
– Coordination
– Persuasion
– Negotiation
– Instructing
– Service Orientation
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Appendix C: First Stage Results
Table C.1: First Stage for Women: Pr(Work in a High Social Job)
White Black Hispanic
BMI Adjusted -0.00207 0.00377 -0.0118∗∗
(0.00233) (0.00280) (0.00435)
Closest Sibiling’s Job level of social interaction 0.0915∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗ 0.0397
(0.0136) (0.0190) (0.0266)
Age 0.00326 -0.0156 0.00406
(0.00660) (0.00972) (0.0126)
Number of Children Ever Had -0.0212 0.0184 0.000668
(0.0184) (0.0219) (0.0288)
Age of Youngest Child -0.0171∗∗∗ 0.00867 -0.0103
(0.00442) (0.00533) (0.00747)
Highest Grade as of May of Svy Year 0.147∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.00765) (0.0128) (0.0136)
Highest Grade Completed by Mother 0.0238∗∗∗ -0.0250∗∗ 0.0109
(0.00666) (0.00935) (0.00820)
Highest Grade Completed by Father 0.0155∗∗ 0.0210∗∗ -0.00638
(0.00494) (0.00650) (0.00766)
Weeks worked in Current Job 0.0000646 0.00000701 0.000582∗∗∗
(0.0000755) (0.000108) (0.000157)
Currently Enrolled in School -0.0760 -0.00655 0.0555
(0.0427) (0.0711) (0.0893)
Work Experience (1000s hours) 0.00937∗∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗ 0.00222
(0.00216) (0.00294) (0.00376)
Year 0.00241 -0.000827 0.0177
(0.00643) (0.00952) (0.0125)
Going to School -0.234∗ -0.0946 -0.223
(0.0932) (0.149) (0.192)
Constant -7.260 -0.738 -36.62
(12.64) (18.73) (24.51)
N 13733 6442 3808
Pseudo R-Squared 0.193 0.268 0.209
Log-Likelihood -7002.5 -3190.9 -1917.1
Standard errors in parentheses. These regressions also included dummies for missing observations
of main co-variates, these are not output it here. The other omitted variable for output is armed forces, marital status dummies,
qualification test percentile score and region dummies. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.2: First Stage for Men: Pr(Work in a High Social Job)
(1) (2) (3)
White Black Hispanic
BMI Adjusted -0.00341 0.00246 -0.00795
(0.00289) (0.00394) (0.00449)
Closest Sibiling’s Job level of social interaction 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0697∗∗∗ 0.00237
(0.0133) (0.0193) (0.0238)
Age -0.00619 -0.0254∗∗ -0.00844
(0.00612) (0.00921) (0.0111)
Number of Children Ever Had -0.0309∗ -0.0188 -0.0374
(0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0229)
Age of Youngest Child -0.0147∗∗ -0.00323 -0.00753
(0.00470) (0.00687) (0.00780)
Highest Grade as of May of Svy Year 0.200∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.00742) (0.0116) (0.0120)
Highest Grade Completed by Mother 0.000543 -0.00786 0.00282
(0.00642) (0.00900) (0.00663)
Highest Grade Completed by Father 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.000860 0.0189∗∗
(0.00470) (0.00669) (0.00637)
Weeks worked in Current Job 0.000381∗∗∗ 0.0000353 0.000497∗∗∗
(0.0000631) (0.000103) (0.000119)
Currently Enrolled in School -0.0925∗ 0.0830 -0.130
(0.0461) (0.0833) (0.0857)
Work Experience (1000s hours) 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.00788∗∗ 0.00269
(0.00183) (0.00250) (0.00326)
Year 0.00708 0.0247∗∗ 0.0259∗
(0.00580) (0.00916) (0.0107)
Married 0.135∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.0164
(0.0348) (0.0536) (0.0615)
Separated -0.0733 0.155 -0.0657
(0.0820) (0.0806) (0.111)
Divorce 0.0383 0.0967 0.163
(0.0495) (0.0755) (0.0892)
Widowed -0.179 0.267 -0.428
(0.373) (0.260) (0.502)
Going to School -0.277∗∗ -0.00463 0.0899
(0.0847) (0.162) (0.176)
Constant -17.16 -51.76∗∗ -53.64∗
(11.42) (18.01) (20.99)
N 14147 6981 4538
Pseudo R-Squared 0.220 0.306 0.215
Log-Likelihood -7614.1 -3248.8 -2445.6
Standard errors in parentheses. These regressions also included dummies for missing observations
of main co-variates, these are not output it here. The other omitted variable for output is armed forces
qualification test percentile score and region dummies. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix D: Relationship between BMI and Wages, other roups
Figure 1: Relationship between BMI and wages across race and gender groups
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